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Among the most formidable defenses of the medieval world was the triple
collar of walls, studded with closely spaced towers, surrounding Constantinople,
the successor city to the glory of Rome. The triple walls are attributed to
Emperor Theodosius, the last emperor to rule over the combined eastern and
western portions of the Roman Empire. The triple walls were intended to protect
the capital of the ancient empire of Byzantium, a city renowned for its culture,
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art, and extravagance. For more than one thousand years the city’s walls had
never been breached, “they had held firm, so that when the army of Sultan
Mehmet finally reined up outside the city on April 6, 1453, the defenders had
reasonable hopes of survival.”1 However, technological advances developed by
a Hungarian cannon founder named Orban, and enthusiastically embraced by
the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet, resulted in the creation of an epic cannon never
seen before. “It was twenty-seven feet long . . . [w]ith a shattering roar and a
cloud of smoke that hazed the sky, the mighty bullet was propelled across the
open countryside for a mile before burying itself six feet down in the soft earth.”2
The introduction of the cannon’s massive technological development,
coupled with thousands of lesser cannons, brought about the end of the
Byzantine Empire and, the Eastern Roman Empire, which had been established
in the fourth century by Constantine the Great. “By nightfall on Monday, May
28, [1453,] the great guns had been firing at the land walls for forty-seven days,”3
causing the city’s defenses to collapse. The Ottomans conquered
Constantinople, sacking it and the treasures it housed, renaming it Istanbul. For
the Western world, “the consequences were religious, military, economic, and
psychological.”4 The unimaginable became reality because of a technological
breakthrough underappreciated by the defenders of Constantinople, but readily
utilized by those able to afford and employ its advantages.
The utilization of assisted reproductive technology (ART), among those able
to afford it, has been no less abrupt or consequential. As with all technological
developments, there has been an evolution. Even though surrogacy was
practiced among the Hebrews, as described in the Hebrew Scriptures,5 artificial
insemination, another variant of ART, has been utilized since the late 18th
century, and was characterized as artificial insemination in the 19th century.6 By
the 1970s, a third procedure became available, in vitro fertilization (IVF), which
describes a procedure in which an egg is fertilized outside of a woman’s body
and is then inserted into any woman’s womb for gestation.7 These assisted
reproductive technologies precipitated businesses, such as fertility clinics, and
the use of cryopreservation, also known as banking. Banking is a process that
1
ROGER CROWLEY, 1453: THE HOLY WAR FOR CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE CLASH OF
ISLAM AND THE WEST 5-6 (2005).
2
Id. at 93-94.
3
Id. at 203.
4
Id. at 241.
5
See Genesis 16:2 (Hagar, a surrogate, giving birth to Abraham’s child because his
wife, Sarah, was barren).
6
See Kara W. Swanson, Adultery by Doctor: Artificial Insemination 1890-1945, 87
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 591, 592-93 (2012).
7
See Janet L. Dolgin, The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transformations, 7
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 37, 44 (1995).
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enables the preservation of sperm, eggs, and embryos for possible future
implantation into a woman for gestation.8
Fertility clinics, cryopreservation of human reproductive materials, and the
increasing number of persons employing their services, precipitated legal
disputes involving the clinics, state agencies, and the clients themselves. These
disputes arose out of posthumous conception and its effect on state and federal
benefits; such as whether the preserved human products constituted divisible
marital property upon divorce, whether wrongful death law suits are applicable
when an embryo is destroyed. Increasing concern over the religious, ethical and
sociological issues involving these human reproductive materials, the donors,
and any child born as a result.9 Eventually, ethical and moral commentary
developed as religious, government, and advocacy groups became aware of the
technological possibilities surrounding assisted reproduction. For example, by
the mid-1970s the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW)
appointed an ethics advisory board to study IVF and review proposals for
funding IVF research.10 That ethics advisory board was soon disbanded in 1980,
with oversight shifting to the Food and Drug Administration in 1998,11 where it
remains today. Congress continues to annually renew the Dickey-Wicker
amendment to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
appropriations bill, which prohibits federal funding “for research that creates
embryos for research purposes or destroys, discards, or subjects an embryo to
risks with no prospect of medical benefit for the embryo.”12
Commentators and religious organizations continue to offer opinions on the
ethical and moral uses of developing technologies involving assisted
reproduction.13 There is indirect federal supervision of the fertility industry
through the Food and Drug Administration, which regulates testing
8
See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITIES—THE
REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES, 29-30 (2004).
9
See, e.g., P.M. v. T.B., 907 N.W.2d 522, 533-34 (Iowa 2018) (holding that surrogacy
contracts do not violate public morals); Morrissey v. U.S., 871 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11 th Cir.
2017) (acknowledging that ART involves multiple moral and ethical issues affecting
divergent interests).
10 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS. ENG’G MED., MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES:
ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 60 (Anne Claiborne et al. eds., 2016).
11 See id. (EAB no longer functioned in 1980, but the regulations required a federal
ethics board).
12 Id. at 62; see also 45 C.F.R § 46.204(d); see generally MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2685
(2017); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3216(a).
13 See, e.g., Justo Aznar et al., Moral Assessment of Frozen Human Embryo Adoption in
the Light of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church, 23 ACTA BIOETHICA 137, 138 (2017)
(discussing moral evaluation of embryo adoption in the Catholic Church); Ainsley J.
Newton et al., Ethical and Legal Issues in Mitochondrial Transfer, 8 EMBO MOLECULAR
MED. 589, 589 (2016); Kevin H. Theriot & Ken Connelly, Free to Do No Harm:
Conscience Protections for Healthcare Professionals, 49 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 549, 551-52 (2017).
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requirements for donated human tissues including eggs and sperm.14 Finally, the
Federal Trade Commission is charged with promoting truth in advertising clinic
success rates.15
In 1978, the first baby was born as a result of IVF technology; only a few
decades ago.16 The baby, Louise Joy Brown may have been the first baby born
as a result of IVF, but she was certainly not the last.17 Forty years later, 7 million
children are the product of this form of medical technology and “the world’s
fertility clinics have blossomed into a $17 billion business.”18 Undoubtedly,
individuals and couples utilizing assisted reproduction will increase as insurance
begins paying for procedures heretofore reserved to those who could afford
them.19 In addition, medical advances will not abate and new reproductive
technologies will challenge “our collective notions about family and the
significance of biology in assigning parental rights.”20
One response to the technological challenge presented by ART is the approval
of a revised Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2017.21 The revised Act includes a
new article, Article 9, addressing the right of children born through assisted
reproductive technology to access medical and identifying information
regarding any gamete providers.22 Article 9 does not require disclosure of the
identity of a gamete donor, but it does require gamete banks and fertility clinics
to ask donors if they want to have their identifying information disclosed when
14 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, Reproduction and Responsibility: The
Regulation of New Biotechnologies,
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/chapter
2.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
15 See Jillian Casey et al., Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
83, 84 n.5 (2016) (the Federal Trade Commission is charged with promoting truth in
advertising clinic success rates under the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act of 1988).
16 Ariana Eunjung Cha, Happy birthday, Louise Brown! 40 years after the first IVF
baby, 8 million more and counting, WASH. POST (July 25, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/07/25/happy-birthdaylouise-brown-40-years-after-the-first-ivf-baby-8-million-more-and-counting.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Valarie Blake, It’s an ART Not a Science: State-Mandated Insurance Coverage of
Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Legal Implications for Gay and Unmarried
Persons, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 651, 653 (2011).
20 Deborah Zalesne, The Intersection of Contract Law, Reproductive Technology, and
the Market: Families in the Age of ART, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 419, 420 (2017).
21 Courtney Joslin & Jamie Pedersen, Updated National Uniform Parentage ACT (UPA
2017) Approved, SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (Nov. 12, 2017),
https://www.sart.org/news-and-publications/news-and-research/legally-speaking/updatednational-uniform-parentage-act-upa-2017-approved.
22 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 905 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 2017).
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the resulting child attains 18 years of age.23 However, it does require disclosure
of non-identifying medical history of the gamete donor.24 The newly approved
code also purposely revised paternity presumptions, acknowledgements, genetic
testing, and assisted reproduction provisions to make them gender neutral.25
Finally, the surrogacy provisions recommended in the Act were updated to make
them more consistent with modern surrogacy practice.26 Additional codes,
practices, and judicial holdings will increasingly accommodate the ascendant
use of assisted reproductive technology.
Building upon reproductive technologies such as artificial insemination
(whether by donor or by husband), IVF, and traditional or gestational surrogacy,
technology has evolved to the point whereby it is possible for a child to be born
with more than two genetic parents.27 On April 6, 2016, a baby boy was born in
Mexico through mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT) using the genetic
material of three different people.28 Lawsuits involving multiple parental claims
pertaining to the same child have proliferated in recent decades. Most of these
claims rely on equitable or contractual causes of action to establish parental
rights over the child.29 However, technology is now available to permit a child
to have a genetic relationship with more than two adults. Viewed from a
perspective of the brief time period between the use of artificial insemination
and IVF, the reality of three-genetic parents is startling.
As judicial disputes and commentary reveal, there currently exists uncertainty
in how to address this technological development resulting in multiple genetic
parents.30 The unique status of a human being is at stake. While “the UK has
taken steps towards explicit authorization of the [mitochondrial replacement]
procedure for use in clinical research, it remains effectively banned or heavily

Id.
Id.
25 Id.
26 See id. § 802 cmt. (explaining how this section is based on newly developed
surrogacy law in several states).
27 See Daniel Green, Assessing Parental Rights for Children with Genetic Material from
Three Parents, 19 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 251, 251 (2018) (explaining how a baby was
born with the genetic material of three people).
28 Id.
29 See Raymond C. O’Brien, Obergefell’s Impact on Functional Families, 66 CATH. U.
L. REV. 363, 385-87 (2016) (describing de facto, contractual, and equitable parentage).
30 See Ruth L. Fischbach et al., Creating a Three-Parent Child: An Educational.
Paradigm for the Responsible Conduct of Research., 15 J. OF MICROBIOLOGY & BIOLOGY
EDUC. 186, 188 (2014) (admitting there are questions surrounding new reproductive
technology that the legal system needs to address); see also Green supra note 27, at 260
(explaining there are four tests that courts commonly use to resolve parentage disputes: “the
application of state statutes and public policy, basing the decision on the best interests of the
child, assigning parentage based on genetic relationship to the child, and assigning parental
rights based on the intent of the potential parents”).
23
24
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restricted in many parts of the world, including most of Europe, the USA,
Australia, New Zealand and Singapore, among others.”31 Experience suggests
that this is a current cautionary approach, but the reality is that the technology is
there and it will be utilized both in reference to multiple genetic parents, but also
for what is yet to come.
Undoubtedly, the possibility of multiple genetic parents challenges the
traditional status of motherhood, family, personhood, and intercourse between a
man and a woman.32 However, this technological challenge will not abate the
opportunity of scientific advances.33 One commentator provides an assessment:
“Public law cannot anticipate the bounds of science in the formation of family
and is not equipped to respond to the myriad questions that go along with cultural
shifts. But what is clear is that as technology continues to evolve, a growing
disconnect between law and technology is inevitable.”34
This Article does not seek to address all of the issues developing around
assisted reproductive technology. For example, the technology used in ART has
created what some have called, the “Wild West of American medicine.”35 Such
technological advances challenge historical, sociological, and religious
underpinnings of family.36 Different assisted reproductive technologies, “such
as ova donation, sperm donation, and gestational surrogacy, typically involving
between three and four parties, present a more complicated landscape because
they fragment the roles of the presumptive, genetic, gestational, and intentional
parents.”37
This Article provides a current assessment of assisted reproductive
technology to understand and address what society must do next. To accomplish
such a goal this Article is divided into four parts. First, this Article provides
statistics on the current utilization of the many forms of technological assistance
employed by single persons, married, and unmarried couples seeking to become
parents. Second, public perception of surrogacy continues to evolve, and this
31 G. Owen Schaefer & Markus K. Labude, Genetic Affinity and the Right to ‘ThreeParent IVF,’ 34 J. ASST. REPROD. GENET. 1577, 1577 (2017).
32 See generally Zalesne, supra note 20, at 419, 487.
33 See generally id.
34 Id. at 481.
35 Karen Wright, Human in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, DISCOVER (May 1,
1998), http://discovermagazine.com/1998/may/humanintheageofm1443.
36 See Yehezkel Margalit et al., The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive
Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 107, 108
(2014) (citing Judith F. Daar, The Prospect of Human Cloning: Improving Nature or
Dooming the Species?, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 514 (2003)) (noting that as a result of
assisted reproductive technology, there is still complex, legal, and societal questions yet to
be answered).
37 Id. at 115; see also Green, supra note 27 (discussing the three relevant relationships
courts have identified when identifying parents).
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Article discusses the judicial and legislative pronouncements both supporting
and forbidding the practice of surrogacy. Third, the technology that makes ART
possible has also precipitated separate legal issues that continue to involve
judicial and legislative action. Among these issues are posthumous conception,
distribution or destruction of genetic materials, and parentage.38 Any exhaustive
treatment of any of these issues is beyond the scope of this particular Article.
But a current assessment is possible and needed; one that speaks to how the issue
is currently being addressed. This discussion illustrates the extent to which
ARTs have influenced the law. Finally, this Article assess what is currently
being decided regarding technological procedures resulting in a child being born
with more than two genetically related parents.
The technological advances made in the last fifty years pertaining to human
reproduction have been both rapid and challenging. Concomitant with these
advances has been the increasing utilization of assisted means of reproduction
by persons and couples able to afford the expensive and risky procedures.
Legislatures are challenged to provide objective, deliberative guidance; funding
organizations, both private and government, must balance the fact that human
life is involved against the goal of medical advancement; courts must balance
standards of public policy against the complaints made by individuals in pursuit
of reproductive autonomy. This Article involves items of grave concern, seeking
only to offer an assessment of where we are presently, amidst these
technological changes.
I. UTILIZATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
A number of national organizations work together to provide commentators
with nationwide statistics derived from ART surveillance.39 Reporting is
mandated by the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992
(FCSRCA), enacted by Congress, which requires all clinics performing ART in
the United States to annually report their success rate data to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).40 These fertility clinics rely upon the
38 See generally Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 785 (Conn. 2011) (explaining that the
law is not as advanced as the scientific technology behind assisted reproductive technology
and providing an example of a dispute over parentage).
39 Saswati Sunderam et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance – United
States, 2015, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (2018) (describing the National ART Surveillance System developed by the
CDC in which “clinics […] that are members of the Society for Assisted Reproductive
Technology (SART) can report their data to NASS through SART”).
40 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a(a); Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-493, 106 Stat. 3146 (1992); 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-5. This law is the only
federal law regulating the infertility industry in the United States, but the Clinical
Laboratories Improvement Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a, provides for federal
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National ART Surveillance System (NASS), which is a web-based data
collection system used by all ART clinics, to report data for each ART procedure
to the CDC.41 The data collected is then used to guide physicians, advocacy
groups, and possible patients in decision-making. The CDC, the Society for
Reproductive Medicine, and the Society of Assisted Reproductive Technology,
work with other groups, such as the National Infertility Association and
Path2Parenthood to amass statistics on procedures and the use of ARTs.42 The
number and variety of these organizations illustrate the scope of technological
reproductive procedures increasingly utilized by a diverse range of citizens.
The National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion,
Division of Reproductive Health (National Center), publishes an annual national
report on the use of ART in the United States.43 Utilizing data provided by
multiple reporting fertility clinics, the National Report provides data that “can
give potential ART patients an idea of the average chances of success.”44
Likewise, the data also provides insight into the utilization of ART, the evolution
of ART procedures, and the trends within this medical process.45 In addition, the
CDC collects and publishes data on an annual basis since 2004.46 The National
Report is submitted two years after the data is assembled and analyzed.47 For
example, the 2013 Report was published in 2015.48 To provide an assessment of
trends and current parameters, this Article will focus on three years of numerical
statistics provided by the National Report, the years 2013-2015.
A. Statistical Trends
1. ART Cycles and Births
The United States Code defines assisted reproductive technology as any
treatment or procedure that includes the handling of human eggs or embryos,
certification of clinical laboratory.
41 Sunderam, supra note 39.
42 See National ART Surveillance, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (May
16, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/art/nass/index.html.
43 See ART Success Rates, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (May 16,
2018), https://www.cdc.gov/art/nass/index.html [hereinafter CDC ART Success].
44 See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2015 Assisted Reproductive
Technology: National Summary Report at 3 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2015report/ART-2015-National-Summary-Report.pdf [hereinafter 2015 CDC Report].
45 Id. at 3-5.
46 Assisted Reproductive Technology, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug.
13, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/art/reports/archive.html.
47 CDC ART Success, supra note 43.
48 See generally CDC ART Success, supra note 43.
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which encompasses many procedures today.49 Recent technological advances
made assisted reproduction possible on a scale not imagined a century ago.
Generally, ART involves combining sperm with ova that has been surgically
removed from a woman’s body and then returning the resulting embryos—
fertilized eggs—to the woman’s uterus or donating the produced embryos to
another woman or couple.50 In addition, the eggs, the semen, or the embryos
may be “banked” with a fertility clinic for potential use in the future.51 While
this may be the most common, this is not the only form of ART.52
References throughout this Article are made to ART cycles and a description
of what this entails illustrates the level of technology now available, and also
provides a glimpse into that which lies ahead. An ART cycle begins when a
woman commences taking medication to stimulate her ovaries so that they will
develop eggs or, if no drugs are given, when the woman begins having her
ovaries monitored (using ultrasound or blood tests) for natural egg production.53
If eggs are produced then the cycle progresses to egg retrieval, which involves a
surgical procedure to collect those eggs from the woman’s ovaries.54 In 2015, as
seen in preceding years, the overwhelming majority of cases involving the
cancellation of the ART cycle, was due to insufficient egg production, or no egg
production at all.55
Once eggs are retrieved, the woman’s eggs are combined with sperm in a
laboratory with the intent to fertilize the eggs.56 If this is successful then the
resulting embryos become available and one or more are selected for transfer,
most often into a woman’s uterus through the cervix (IVF), but sometimes into
the fallopian tubes (GIFT or ZIFT).57 Transfer usually occurs within six days
after retrieval, though transfers occurring five days after retrieval have higher
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-7.
2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 8, 10.
51 Id. at 51.
52 Infertility FAQ, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/infertility/index.htm.
53 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2014 Assisted Reproductive
Technology: National Summary Report at 12 (2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/art/reports/2014/national-summary.html [hereinafter 2014 CDC
Report].
54 See generally In vitro fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/about/pac-20384716.
55 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 14.
56 Id. at 13.
57 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53 (stating that in 2014, there were 92,862 cycles
started, 83,114 retrievals, 67,070 transfers, 30,647 pregnancies, and 25,016 live-birth
deliveries. Additionally, of these transfers, in 83% of cases, one or two embryos were
transferred to the woman. One embryo was transferred 28.8% of the time, while two were
transferred 54.1% of the time. In general, multiple embryos resulting in multiple fetus
pregnancies raise the risk of premature birth, low birth weight, and pregnancy
complications).
49
50
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live-birth percentages, assuming that the embryo survives that long.58 The goal
of the ART cycle is for one or more of the transferred embryos to implant within
the woman’s uterus and achieve a clinical pregnancy.59 The hope is that this
clinical pregnancy will progress to a live birth. As stated previously, in the
majority of cases there is not enough egg production to proceed and more than
82% of cycles were cancelled in 2014 for this reason.60 However, in more than
11% (12.5% in 2015)61 of the cases reported, the patient withdraws from the
process for other reasons.62
Success rates for ART cycles have increased slightly since the CDC began
monitoring data in 1995.63 A consistent pattern indicates that a “woman’s age is
the most important factor for having a live birth when her own eggs are used.”64
On the other hand, when donor eggs are used, women aged 40 or older generally
have much higher percentages of live births.65 To illustrate, in 2015, of the ART
cycles that used frozen eggs from a donor and a fresh embryo, 6% resulted in
cancellations, 47% in pregnancies, 39% in live births, and 30% in single infant
births.66
In 2013, the National Center collected data from 467 fertility clinics then in
operation and able to verify data submitted.67 These clinics reported in 2013, that
the number of ART cycles performed in the United States increased 25% from
2004 to 2013,68 for a total of 190,773 ART cycles performed in 2013.69 From
these cycles “[t]he number of infants born who were conceived using ART
increased from 49,458 in 2004 to 66,706 in 2013.”70 The CDC reports that in
2013 approximately 1.5% of all infants born in the United States were conceived

2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 37-38.
Id.
60 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 13.
61 Id.; 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 14.
62 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 13.
63 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 7.
64 Id. at 21.
65 Id. at 22.
66 Id. at 12.
67 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2013 Assisted Reproductive
Technology: National Summary Report, at 3 (2015),
ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/art/ART-2013-Clinic-Report-Full.pdf [hereinafter 2013
CDC Report].
68 Id. at 49 (defining Assisted Reproductive Technology as: “All treatments or
procedures that include the handling of human eggs or embryos to help a woman become
pregnant. ART includes but is not limited to in vitro fertilization (IVF), gamete
intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), tubal embryo transfer,
egg and embryo cryopreservation, egg and embryo donation, and gestational surrogacy.”).
69 Id.
70 Id.
58
59
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using some form of ART.71 Because more than one infant may be born during a
live-birth delivery (for example, twins), the total number of infants born will be
greater than the number of ART cycles performed.72 In addition, the number of
ART cycles using eggs or embryos not genetically related to the parent(s) who
will raise the child increased 32% between 2004 and 2013.73 This figure
indicates greater reliance upon donor eggs or embryos when seeking parenthood.
From 2005 through 2014 the number of ART cycles performed in the United
States has increased 26%, and the number of live births in 2014 was almost one
and a half times higher than in 2005.74 Likewise, the number of infants born who
were conceived using ART increased from 52,041 in 2005 to 68,791 in 2014.75
By 2014, the number of fertility clinics within the United States rose to 498 and
the number of clinics submitting data was 458.76 ART cycles performed at these
clinics rose to 208,604 in 2014, a substantial increase from the 190,773 recorded
in 2013.77 The CDC reports that “[t]he number of clinics, cycles performed, livebirth deliveries, and infants born as a result of ART have all increased steadily
since CDC began collecting this information in 1995.”78 Indeed, by 2014 the
“CDC estimates that ART accounts for slightly less than 2% of total US
births.”79
By 2015, there were 464 clinics reporting data and 231,936 ART cycles were
performed at these reporting clinics.80 As a result of the ART cycles performed
in 2015, 72,913 infants were born, a dramatic increase from the previous year.81
From 2005 through 2014, the percentage of transfers using fresh nondonor
eggs or embryos that resulted in single-infant live births increased from 28% in
2005 to 35% in 2014 for women younger than 35 (the percentage rose in every
other age group as well).82 This increasing trend continued in 2015, when 39%
of ART cycles used fresh nondonor eggs or embryos.83 Parties participating in
71 Casey et al., supra note 15, at 86 (citing 2013 ART Fertility Success Rates: Latest
Data, 2013).
72 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 7.
73 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 50.
74 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 49 (stating that from 1993 to 2013 the use of
ART in the United States tripled); see also CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
2011 Assisted Reproductive Technology: National Summary Report at 8 (2013),
https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2011-report/fertility-clinic/art_2011_clinic_report-full.pdf
[hereinafter 2011 CDC Report].
75 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 49.
76 Id. at 7.
77 Id. at 3; see also 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 5.
78 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 7.
79 Id.
80 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 3.
81 Id. at 3.
82 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 54.
83 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44 at 8.
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the ART cycles who intended to become parents through ART may have
contributed to a higher probability of having a child even when there were other
adverse conditions present.84 The fertility clinics’ data reports that “[o]f the
190,773 ART cycles performed in 2013 at these reporting clinics, 163,209 cycles
(86%) were started with the intent to transfer at least one embryo.85 These
163,209 cycles resulted in 54,323 live births (deliveries of one or more living
infants) and 67,996 infants.”86 Furthermore, “[i]n 2013, the percentage of ART
cycles resulting in live births was higher than the national percentage for patients
with ovulatory dysfunction, endometriosis, male factor, or unknown factor
infertility; it was lower for patients with tubal factor, diminished ovarian reserve,
uterine factor, ‘other’ factor, or multiple infertility factors.”87
2. Cryopreservation
Cryopreservation involves the practice of freezing eggs or embryos from a
patient’s ART cycle for potential future use.88 Whenever frozen (cryopreserved)
embryos are thawed and transferred to a woman, this is referred to as a “frozen
embryo cycle.”89 The use of frozen nondonor embryos are both less expensive
and less invasive because the woman does not have to go through the fertility
drug stimulation and egg retrieval process again.90
During 2013, of the 163,209 ART cycles started with the intent to transfer at
least one embryo, “2,655 cycles were reported with the intent to thaw a
previously frozen egg, fertilize the egg, and then transfer the resulting
embryo.”91 In addition, in the same year, “27,564 cycles (14%) were started with
the intent of cryopreserving (freezing) and storing all resulting eggs or embryos
for potential future use.”92 The “banking” or cryopreservation of fresh nondonor
Id. at 22.
2013 CDC Report, supra note 67 at 3.
86 Id. (stating that an “ART cycle is started when a woman begins taking medication to
stimulate the ovaries to develop eggs or, if no drugs are given, when the woman begins
having her ovaries monitored (using ultrasound or blood tests) for natural egg production.”);
2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 63 (“ART cycles include any process in which (1) an
ART procedure is performed, (2) a woman has undergone ovarian stimulation or monitoring
with the intent of having an ART procedure, or (3) frozen embryos have been thawed with
the intent of transferring them to a woman.”).
87 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 25.
88 Id. at 61.
89 Id. at 62.
90 Mary Ellen Pavone et al., Comparing thaw survival, Implantation and live births from
cryopreserved zygotes, embryos and blastocysts, J. HUM. REPROD. SCI., 23-28 (2011),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3136065.
91 2013 CDC REPORT, supra note 67, at 3.
92 Id.
84
85
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eggs or embryos increased dramatically from 2004 through 2013, approaching
nearly 30,000.93
By 2014, there were 208,604 cycles started, and of these cycles 173,198 of
them were started with the intent of transferring at least one embryo.94 Of this
number, there were 3,596 cycles reported with the intent to thaw a previously
frozen egg, fertilize the egg, and then transfer the resulting embryo.95 However,
the majority of persons choosing cryopreservation did so to store all eggs or
embryos for potential future use, a practice referred to as banking.96 In 2014,
27% of all ART cycles used frozen nondonor embryos,97 the number rising to
30% in 2015.98 Between 2005 and 2014, banking of nondonor eggs for future
use increased dramatically.99 The increase in banking continued in 2015 with
20% of the 231,936 ART cycles initiated with the intent of cryopreserving and
storing all resulting eggs or embryos for potential future use.100
Cryopreservation is increasingly utilized in the technological process of ART.
In about 49% of ART cycles performed in 2013 fresh (non-frozen) nondonor
eggs or embryos were used.101 ART cycles that used frozen nondonor embryos
were the next most common type, accounting for 25% of the total.102 The
percentages of transfers from a total of 46,779 ART cycles resulting in
pregnancies, live births and single-infant live births were higher for frozen
nondonor embryos than for fresh nondonor embryos in 2013.103 However, note
that the percentages of transfers resulting in pregnancies, live births, and singleinfant live births were lower for transfers using frozen donor embryos compared
with fresh donor embryos.104 While the statistics may be anesthetizing, they
point to the increased utilization of ART, by a wider range of patients, and the
93 Id. at 50 (stating that the freezing of embryos for possible future use is controversial
because of an embryo’s potential for life); see, e.g., Zalesne, supra note 20, at 461-67;
Theriot & Connelly, supra note 13, at 560-63.
94 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 3.
95 Id. at 3, 55 (quoting “From 2005 through 2014, transfers of one embryo more than
tripled from 9% to almost 29%.”).
96 Id. at 3.
97 Id. at 8.
98 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 8.
99 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 50.
100 2015 CDC REPORT, supra note 44, at 3 (“Banking continues to be a subject of
concern. Some argue that the woman who banks her eggs disrespects the sacredness of
motherhood, while others argue that given “her particular circumstances, if a woman
believes that freezing her embryos is the best way to bring about . . . future flourishing,
respecting the dignity of motherhood does not warrant interference.”); Zalesne, supra note
20, at 463; but see John S. Grabowski & Christopher Gross, Dignitas Personae and the
Adoption of Frozen Embryos, 10 NAT’L. CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 307, 309 (2010).
101 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 8.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 43.
104 Id. at 43, 46.
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varied forms of technological procedures now available.
3. Age as a Factor in Utilizing ART
All of the data provided by the CDC since reporting started in 1995, concludes
that the likelihood of a successful response to ovarian stimulation and
progression to egg retrieval decreases as a woman grows older.105 In addition,
whenever egg retrieval is successful, the eggs are less likely to reach the transfer
phase, and even if successful, it is less likely to result in pregnancy or live birth
because the possibility of miscarriage increases as a woman ages.106 To
illustrate, in 2014, 37% of all cycles involving women younger than 35 resulted
in live births, but that percentage drops to 1% for women older than 44.107
Consistent among most age groups was the fact that ART cycles using fresh
nondonor eggs or embryos resulting in live births was lower among women who
previously had one or more unsuccessful ART cycles.108 This is because as a
woman ages the likelihood of a successful response to ovarian stimulation and
progression to egg retrieval decreases (there is also less likelihood of a
successful transfer, pregnancy, and live birth).109 The CDC has reported that “a
woman’s age is the most important factor for having a live birth when her own
eggs are used.”110 Often cycles that progress to pregnancy result in
miscarriage.111 In contrast, women using donor eggs had a much higher
percentages of live births no matter what their age, since the egg donors are
typically in their 20s and 30s.112 “The percentage of cycles performed with donor
eggs increased sharply after age 40. Among women older than age 48, for
example, approximately 90% of all ART cycles used donor eggs, of which more
than two-thirds used frozen embryos created from donor eggs.”113
The “average age of women using ART services in 2013 was 36,”114 but it
should be noted that this is the average age—the largest group of women using
ART being younger than 35 (38%).115 Around “20% of ART cycles were
performed among women aged 35-37, 19% among women 38-40, 11% among
2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 24; see also Sunderam, supra note 39.
2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 23.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 28.
109 Id. at 23.
110 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 21.
111 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 22.
112 Id. at 46.
113 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 46.
114 Id. at 9 (In 2015 the average age was slightly more than 35 and the median age was
35. Nearly 65% of all women utilizing ART cycles in 2015 were women aged 30-39).
115 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 9.
105
106
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women aged 41-42, 7% among women aged 43-44, and 5% among women older
than 44.”116 The age of the woman continues to be a major factor in determining
whether the ART cycle will result in a live birth.117 “Overall, 40% of cycles
started in 2013 among women younger than age 35 resulted in live births. “This
percentage decreased to 32% among women aged 35-37, 21% among women
aged 38-40, 11% among women aged 41-42, 5% among women aged 43-44, and
2% among women older than age 44.”118
In 2013 and 2014, the average age of women using ART was 36 years-ofage.119 However, women less than 35 years-of-age represented approximately
38% of all ART cycles performed in that year: 20% of ART cycles were
performed among women aged 35-37, 19% among women aged 38-40, 10%
among women aged 41-42, 7% among women aged 43-44, and 6% among
women older than 44.120 The percentages of “fresh nondonor cycles performed
were greater than frozen nondonor cycles in all age groups. Percentages of fresh
or frozen donor cycles were about the same in younger age groups.”121 While
older age groups typically undergo frozen donor cycles more than fresh donor
cycles.122
4. Embryos Transferred
Of the ART cycles studied that used fresh nondonor eggs or embryos in 2013,
“36% of cycles resulted in clinical pregnancy; about 24% resulted in a singlefetus pregnancy, 10% [resulted] in a multiple-fetus pregnancy, and 2% [of this
group resulted] in a pregnancy where the number of fetuses could not be
determined.”123 In addition, about “82% of the pregnancies resulted in a live
birth (about 60% in the birth of a single infant and 22% in the birth of multiple
infants).”124 Meanwhile, “about 17% of pregnancies resulted in miscarriage,
stillbirth, abortion, or maternal death prior to birth.”125 Additionally, it should
be noted that “single-infant births have a lower risk than multiple-infant births
for poor infant health outcomes, including prematurity, low birth weight,

Id.
Hye Ok Kim et al., Predictors of Live Birth and Pregnancy Success After in Vitro
Fertilization in Infertile Women Aged 40 and Over, CLINICAL EXPERIMENTAL REPROD.
MED., June 2017, at 111.
118 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 23.
119 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 9.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 10.
122 Id.
123 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 15.
124 Id. at 16.
125 Id.
116
117

16

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 27.1

disability, and death.”126 This finding is consistent throughout the data and
recent reports find similar results. The “percentage of transfers of fresh nondonor
eggs or embryos in 2014 resulting in the live birth of a single, term, and normal
birth weight infant decreased as the number of embryos transferred
increased.”127 Indeed, the 2014 data revealed that “the percentage of singleinfant live births was highest with the transfer of one embryo (98%).”128
Likewise, in 2015 data concluded that the “percentage of transfers resulting in
the live birth of a single, term, and normal birth weight infant decreased from
approximately 30% among cycles that involved the transfer of one embryo to
11% among cycles that involved the transfer of four or more embryos.”129
In 2013, the majority of ART cycles that used fresh nondonor eggs or embryos
and that progressed to the embryo transfer stage involved the transfer of one
(23.6%) or two (55.7%) embryos.130 Almost 21% of transfers involved three or
more embryos, 6% involved four or more embryos, and 2% of transfers involved
five or more embryos.131 Once an egg is retrieved for fertilization and then
fertilized, the resulting embryo may be transferred into the woman’s uterus
anytime in the next 1 to 6 days, the most common were transfers after three or
five days.132 Furthermore, “[t]he percentage of transfers resulting in the live birth
of a single, term, and normal birth weight infant decreased as the number of
embryos transferred increased.”133
5. Gestational Carriers/Surrogates
Often a surrogate134 is used to carry a child to term, using her own eggs or
eggs from a donor. Between 2005 and 2014 the number of ART cycles using a
gestational carrier nearly doubled in number.135 “The percentage of transfers
using a gestational carrier among all transfers also increased, from about 2% in
2005 to about 3% in 2014.”136

Id. at 53.
2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 33.
128 Id. at 35.
129 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 34.
130 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 31.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 36.
133 Id. at 33.
134 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(1-2) cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 2017) (defining a surrogate as a woman who is not an intended parent and who
agrees to become pregnant through assisted reproduction using her own gametes (genetic
surrogate) or gametes that are not her own (gestational surrogate)).
135 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 52.
136 Id.
126
127
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In 2013, data reported to the CDC showed, the “percentages of transfers that
resulted in live births were higher among gestational carrier [surrogates] cycles
in all age groups except older than age 44.”137 Gestational carriers were used in
about 1% of fresh nondonor ART cycles in 2013 (822 cycles) and similarly in
2014.138 Overall, the percentage of live births when using a gestational carrier
was 8% higher among women younger than age 35, 4% higher among women
aged 35-37, 10% higher among women aged 38-40, 12% higher among women
aged 41-42, and 8% higher among women aged 43-44.139 There are similar
statistics in both 2014 and 2015.140
Greater acceptance of surrogacy agreements occurred following the famous
1988 decision, In re Baby M, where the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that
the genetic surrogacy agreement violated state public policy.141 Presently, the
District of Columbia, New York, and only three other jurisdictions ban
surrogacy outright.142 While seven states allow surrogacy through case law
precedent, there are twenty-two states that statutorily permit surrogacy with
certain limitations.143 Alternatively, twenty-one states remain silent on the
issue.144
B. Financial Cost of ART
1. Cycles
Because of location, the health status of participants, and the extent of
treatment options, it is difficult to provide an accurate assessment of the cost of
an ART cycle. One study estimates that the cost of one IVF treatment, often not
covered by the few insurance policies that do cover infertility treatments, is
$12,500.145 Costs for achieving a live birth can range from $66,000 to
$114,000.146
One published report provides that:
IVF treatment costs can vary widely depending on age, medical history,
location, and the number of accessible fertility clinics. According to
2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 41.
Id.; 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 41.
139 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 41.
140 See 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 41; 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 42.
141 Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253 (N.J. 1988).
142 Zalesne, supra note 20, at 429.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See Katie Falloon & Philip M. Rosoff, Who Pays? Mandate Insurance Coverage for
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 16 AM. MED. ASS’N J. OF ETHICS 63, 63 (2014).
146 Id.
137
138
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RESOLVE, the National Infertility Association, the average cost of a
single IVF cycle using fresh embryos is $8,158—not including
medications. Each IVF treatment cycle is a multistep process, in which
eggs are extracted, fertilized with sperm in a lab, then placed in the
uterus once the embryo develops to a certain point. The fertility drugs
that release the hormones that boost egg production and make the uterus
more receptive to embryo implantation can vary from $60 to $6,000 per
cycle.147
Some commentators predict that competition among clinics, plus increased
technological efficiency over time, will eventually drive the prices down, as
happens with most new technologies.148 Indeed, it is arguable that the increasing
use of assisted reproductive technology and greater access to financing, work in
tandem. “In most cases, the market is a necessary catalyst for technological
change—commercialization is what propels technological advancements
forward.”149
At least one organization, RESOLVE, provides assistance in making
resources accessible to persons seeking to use fertility services, establishing a
network of support, and advocating on behalf of fertility options. RESOLVE is
a non-profit organization, founded in 1974, that is certified under the National
Health Council Standards of Excellence.150 It describes itself as the national
fertility association and seeks to provide help to those who may be victimized
by unequal access due to the high cost of treatments that is often not covered by
insurance.151 RESOLVE offers many aspects of infertility response.152 For
example, it provides access to information about area support groups, available
insurance coverage, legislative advocacy, and advice on the ways to address
infertility.153
147 In Vitro Fertilization Cost: Can you Afford IVF Treatment?, DISCOVER: Health and
Family (Aug. 21, 2017) https://www.discover.com/personal-loans/resources/majorexpenses/fertility-costs/#_edn2 (last visited Dec. 1, 2018); see also State Laws Related to
Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, NAT’L. CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (April 27,
2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-for-infertility-laws.aspx
(quoting the University of Iowa Stead Family Children’s Hospital study reporting that each
cycle of IVF costs $12,000 to $17,000 on average).
148 See Zalesne, supra note 20, at 445.
149 Id. at 487; see also Jillian Casey et al., supra note 15, at 113-15 (discussing progress
being made to supply insurance coverage for ART).
150 Fast Facts About Resolve: The National Infertility Association, RESOLVE,
https://resolve.org/about-us/fast-facts-resolve-national-infertility-association/ (last visited
Oct. 8, 2018).
151 Id.; Uddoh v. United Healthcare, 254 F. Supp. 3d 424, 426 (E.D. N.Y. 2017)
(showing an example of insurance refusing to pay for fertility treatments).
152 Coping Techniques, RESOLVE, https://resolve.org/support/managing-infertilitystress/coping-techniques/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
153 Id.
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Location of fertility clinics is important because not only does the cost of
infertility treatments vary among the states, so do the laws mandating insurance,
treatment options, and religious exemptions for treatment of persons seeking
infertility treatments.154 Legislatures are at the cusp of addressing issues of sex
discrimination under Title VII and whether IVF should be encompassed within
the purview of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).155 Similarly, the liberty
interest guaranteed to same-sex couples under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges156 has yet to be fully explored.157
There are also the ethical and moral issues to consider: “Though unsurprising,
[the fact that access to ART is more accessible to the wealthy, than the poor] is
morally problematic. If genetic reproduction is broadly believed to be of truly
fundamental importance, then access to IVF in a just society would depend on
need, not on morally irrelevant characteristics like wealth or education status.”158
Meaning “[t]he service would be available to everyone who could medically
benefit from it, rather than only to those who could pay for it.”159 Insurance
mandates create “lower costs for ART services so that use of the technology
would be based less on financial status.”160 The proven success of insurance
mandates is shown in the fact that “ART is higher in states where insurance
coverage . . . is mandatory.”161

154 See, e.g., Camille M. Davidson, Octomom and Multi-Fetal Pregnancies: Why
Federal Legislation Should Require Insurers to Cover In Vitro Fertilization, 17 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 135, 165-66 (2010); see generally Katherine Johnson, Charting
Infertility in the Workplace: An Analysis of Hall v. Nalco and the Seventh Circuit’s
Recognition of Sex Discrimination Based on In Vitro Fertilization, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
1283, 1317-19 (2010); Gwenn Dobos, The Relevance of “Related”: Should “Related
Medical Conditions” Include In Vitro Fertilization Under the PDA? - Hall v. Nalco, 534
F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008), 78 U. CONN. L. REV. 399, 399 (2009).
155 See generally Johnson, supra note 157, at 1283, 1296; see generally Dobos, supra
note 157 at 399.
156 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (holding that same-sex
couples have a liberty interest under the United States Constitution to enter into marriage,
and to have their marriages recognized by other states).
157 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1747
(2018) (analyzing Obergefell in the context of First Amendment liberty rights and same-sex
couples); Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (reinforcing Obergefell by
invalidating Arkansas statute that required the name of mother’s male spouse to appear on
child’s birth certificate when mother conceived child by means of artificial insemination,
but allowed omission of mother’s female spouse from child’s birth certificate under the
same circumstances).
158 Falloon & Rosoff, supra note 146, at 64.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
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2. Insurance Coverage
Commentators suggest that, in time, insurance coverage for fertility
treatments will become increasingly available.162 “As use of ARTs become more
widespread, consumers of insurance policies will begin to demand better
coverage of fertility treatments.”163 However, there is not currently a universal
state, or federal requirement that infertility be covered by insurance.164 Medicaid
will not pay for infertility treatments, but Congress, as part of the fiscal year
2018 budget, extended IVF services for qualified wounded veterans for another
two years.165 Due to lack of public funding, ART is most often paid for with
private funds, restricting treatments to wealthier individuals.166
There are many reasons why mandated insurance coverage is appealing
and why it would be desirable for this technology to be available to all
those who want it. Infertility affects approximately 10 percent of
couples at any given time worldwide, and the high cost of ART is a
major barrier to its use [citation omitted]. National survey data indicate
that insurance coverage and finances are the main factors in whether or
not a woman seeks medical help to become pregnant. [citation omitted].
There is an 11 percent chance that low-income women will pursue
ART, while high-income women are almost twice as likely to do so
[citation omitted.]. It is therefore not surprising that those who have
access to ART are wealthier and have had more education than the
average person [citation omitted].167
Currently, fifteen states have enacted legislation requiring that private
insurance cover all or some of infertility treatment.168 The fifteen states include:
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas
and West Virginia.169 The laws of these states also vary greatly, some requiring
See generally Casey et al., supra note 15, at 123.
Id.
164 See Falloon & Rosoff, supra note 146, at 63.
165 See SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., Congress Approves FY18 Budget; Extends
IVF Services for Wounded Veterans (Mar. 22, 2018), http://www.sart.org/news-andpublications/news-and-research/press-releases-and-bulletins/congress-approves-fy18budget-extends-ivf-services-for-wounded-veterans.
166 Falloon & Rosoff, supra note 146, at 65.
167 Id. at 63-64.
168 See NAT’L CONF. FOR STATE LEGIS., supra note 150; Eight states mandate
reimbursement for ART. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Key Findings:
Infertility Mandates and Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology (Apr. 13, 2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/art/key-findings/insurance.html.
169 Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Mandated Coverage of Infertility Treatment, KFF
(2015), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/state-indicator/infertilitycoverage/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort
162
163
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insurers to cover or offer coverage of infertility diagnosis and treatment.
To illustrate differences among the states, California law requires group
health care service plans to offer coverage for the treatment of infertility, except
for in vitro fertilization.170 The law also accommodates religious beliefs by
exempting employers from compliance if this would be inconsistent with the
organization’s religious or ethical values.171 Arkansas, on the other hand,
provides that all individual and group insurance policies that provide maternity
benefits must cover IVF, including cryopreservation.172 Insurers may choose to
include other infertility procedures or treatments under the IVF benefit;
however, insurers relying upon the mandated coverage are required to meet the
following standards:
(1) there is a lifetime maximum of $15,000 for coverage; (2) the
patient’s eggs must be fertilized with her husband’s sperm; (3) the
patient has been unable to obtain successful pregnancy through any less
costly infertility treatments covered by insurance; (4) the IVF procedure
must be performed at a facility licensed or certified by the state in
conformity with state law; (5) coverage is limited to preexisting
conditions of 12 months; (6) the patient and her spouse must have at
least a two year history of unexplained infertility or the infertility must
be associated with at least one of the following: endometriosis, DES
exposure, blocked or surgically removed fallopian tubes that are not the
result of voluntary sterilization, or abnormal male factors contributing
to the infertility.173
However, New Jersey requires health insurers in the state to provide coverage
for “medically necessary expenses incurred in the diagnosis and treatment of
infertility.”174 This includes medications, and procedures, including “surgery, in
vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, artificial insemination, gamete intrafallopian
transfer, zygote intrafallopian transfer, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, and
four completed egg retrievals per lifetime of the covered person.”175 The law
includes some restrictions as well as a religious exemption for employers that
provide coverage to fewer than fifty employees.176
Looking to the future, there is some indication that government will become
%22:%22asc%22%7D; see, e.g., ARK. CODE § 23-85-137 (2011); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 1374.55 (2014); OHIO REV. CODE § 1751.01 (2016); TEX. INS. CODE §1366.001 et
seq. (2003).
170 CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6(a) (2014).
171 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55(e) (2014); CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6(e)(1)
(2014).
172 ARK. ADMIN. CODE § 054.00.1-8 (2018).
173 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-85-137(c) (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. 23-86-118(c) (2018).
174 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x(a) (2001) (amended 2017).
175 Id.
176 Id. §§ 17:48-6x(a)(8)(b), 7w(a), 35.22 (a, b), 46.1x(4)(a).
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more proactive in mandating insurance coverage for fertility treatments. For
example, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, as part of his agenda for his 2018
Women’s Agenda for New York: Equal Rights, Equal Opportunity, announced
plans to improve access to in vitro fertilization and fertility treatment services
for New Yorkers.177 The governor directed the New York State Department of
Financial Services to examine approaches for incorporating fertility treatments
into what already exists under New York law.178 The governor cited statistics
stating that approximately 12% of women between the ages of 18 and 44 years
old struggle to conceive or carry a pregnancy to term.179 The Department of
Financial Services is tasked with ensuring that all New Yorkers have access to
infertility treatment and preservation services, regardless of sexual orientation
or marital status.180
Currently, New York state law prohibits individual and group health
insurance policies from excluding coverage for hospital care, surgical care, and
medical care for diagnosis and treatment of correctable medical conditions
otherwise covered by the applicable policy, solely because the medical condition
results in infertility.181 In 2002, the New York legislature amended state law to
require certain insurers to cover infertility treatment for women between the ages
of 21 and 44, but the law excludes coverage for in vitro fertilization, gamete
intrafallopian tube transfers, and zygote intrafallopian tube transfers.182 Then in
2011, New York law was further amended to mandate that every insurance
policy provides coverage for prescription fertility drugs and permits these drugs
to be purchased at all types of pharmacies.183
II. SURROGACY
Surrogacy as a parenting option has ancient roots, even biblical references,184
but historically, surrogacy is distinctive in that the woman, not intending to be a
177 See N.Y. LAWS A779 ch. 598 (2011); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807 (2015); see also
N.Y. GOV., New York Governor Announces Actions to Improve Access to IVF and Fertility
Preservation Services, (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomoannounces-actions-improve-access-ivf-and-fertility-preservation-services.
178 New York Governor Cuomo Makes Access to IVF Care a Priority in 2018 Policy
Agenda for Women, AM. SOC’Y REPROD. MED. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.asrm.org/newsand-publications/news-and-researc
179 Press Release, Dep’t. Fin. Servs., Governor Cuomo Announces Actions to Improve
Access to IVF and Fertility Preservation Services (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1805231.htm.
180 Id.
181 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216(i)(13)(A,B); N.Y. INS. LAW § 4303 (2011).
182 See N.Y. INS. LAW §3221(g)(6).
183 See NAT’L CONF. FOR STATE LEGIS., supra note 150.
184 See Genesis, supra note 5 at 16:1-16.

2018]

Assessing Assisted Reproductive Technology

23

parent, agrees to become pregnant and carry a child to term using her own
gamete under a genetic surrogacy agreement.185 The 2017 version of the UPA
refers to this woman as a genetic surrogate.186 The fact that the woman is using
her own gamete provides a heightened scrutiny and claim to parentage on her
part.
However, modern ART has expanded surrogacy options beyond genetic
surrogacy, enabling a woman, not intending to be a parent, to become pregnant
using gametes that are not her own under a surrogacy agreement.187 The 2017
UPA refers to this woman as a gestational surrogate.188 Through IVF, adult
parties may enter into “collaborative reproduction” arrangements whereby a
surrogate may gestate a fetus using donor gametes.189 The surrogacy contract
may include any of these assisted reproduction means, meant to cause
pregnancy, other than through sexual intercourse, such as: (1) intrauterine or
intracervical insemination; (2) donations of gametes; (3) donation of embryos;
(4) in vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; or (5) intracytoplasmic sperm
injection.190 These technological advances far exceed the sole means envisioned
in ancient times.
Surrogates in the United States tend to live above the poverty level, have
already given birth to at least one child, and have a stable, sensible lifestyle.191
One profile describes a surrogate in the following fashion: married, Christian,
middle-class, with two to three biological children, working a part-time job,
living in a small town or suburb, rather than a big city, with at least some
education from a higher institution, but usually a bachelor’s degree.192 In the
185 See, e.g., P.M. v. T.B., 907 N.W.2d 522, 530-31 (Iowa 2018) (illustrating how a
successful surrogacy contract operates among consenting parties), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. June 4, 2018) (No. 17-1631).
186 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(1).
187 Id. §§ 102(10), 801(1), (3) (defining a ‘gamete’ as “sperm, egg, or any part of a sperm
or egg”, a ‘genetic surrogate’ as “one who uses her own gamete”, and a ‘surrogacy
agreement’ as an agreement between intended parent(s) and woman who agrees to become
pregnant through assisted reproduction); Susan Imrie et al., The Long-term Experiences of
Surrogates: Relationships and Contact with Surrogacy Families in Genetic and Gestational
Surrogacy Arrangements, 29 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 424, 425 (2014).
188 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(2) (defining “gestational surrogate” as one who does not
use her own gamete).
189 In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(considering surrogacy agreement in which a woman gave birth to baby with whom she
shared no genetic connection).
190 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(4).
191 Surrogate Requirements, CONCEIVEABILITIES,
https://conceiveabilities.com/surrogates/surrogate-requirements (last visited Nov. 16, 2018);
Surrogacy Question: What You Need to Know, JOY OF LIFE SURROGACY,
http://www.joyoflifesurrogacy.com/surrogacy-question (last visited Nov. 16, 2018).
192 Leslie Morgan Steiner, Who Becomes a Surrogate?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 25, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/11/who-becomes-a-surrogate/281596.
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United States, statistics show that surrogates fall into the average household
income category of under $60,000.193 About 15% to 20% of surrogates are
military
wives
and
some
are
single
women.194
“Of the women who serve as surrogates for CSP” (the Center for Surrogate
Parenting) and “are married [to] husbands who support paid surrogacy . . .
roughly 35 percent repeat the experience.”195
A. Disparate Couples
While surrogacy may have begun with an infertile married couple seeking to
have a child with a biological connection to at least one spouse, that paradigm
has expanded to include unmarried opposite-sex and same-sex couples. These
two groups have expanded drastically in recent decades.196 Some argue that one
reason why surrogacy has been increasingly accepted is because there has been
a concomitant expansion of rights for the LGBTQ community, especially for
gay men seeking to become parents through a biological connection.197
However, opposite-sex nonmarital couples have also had an impact on
surrogacy. One of the first decisions involving opposite-sex nonmarital partners
involved the disposition of cryogenically-preserved sperm and whether public
policy allowed the man to release his sperm to his nonmarital partner during his
lifetime, or at his death.198 In Hecht v. Superior Court, a man committed suicide
prior to releasing his sperm to his partner, but he bequeathed the sperm in his
last will and testament, which she subsequently requested from the sperm
bank.199 The man’s then living children opposed giving her their father’s sperm,
arguing that doing so violated public policy because the two partners were
unmarried and any birth would impose a step-sibling upon them.200 However,
the California Appellate Court held that the man’s sperm was his separate,
personal property and, as such, could be bequeathed through his estate.201
Furthermore, artificially inseminating the decedent’s partner with the decedent’s
Id.
Id.
195 Id.
196 See generally O’Brien, supra note 29, at 385-87 (discussing the impact of de facto
parenthood and same-sex marriage on functional families); Anne R. Dana, The State of
Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 353, 356-58 (2011) (advocating for an intent test to determine parentage in surrogacy
arrangements).
197 See, e.g., Zalesne, supra note 20, at 428.
198 Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 285-87, 289-91 (Ct. App. 1993).
199 Id. at 276-78.
200 Id. at 279, 284.
201 Id. at 283.
193
194
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sperm is a personal decision and did not violate public policy of the state.202
But significant resistance to surrogacy remains, especially when it involves a
genetic surrogate. As one commentator observes, “American culture heralds a
natural mother-child bond,” and “surrogate women are sometimes seen as
deviant mothers, making the decision to give up a child before getting pregnant
and violating the sacred bond between mother and child in the process.”203
For same-sex couples the issue of surrogacy is more complicated since samesex marriage was not an option in all of the states until 2015.204 In addition, some
states had policies discouraging same-sex parenthood, and there were, and are,
continuing restraints upon enforcing surrogacy contracts that may be
accentuated by the fact that same-sex parties are involved.205 The difficulties
encountered by same-sex couples is illustrated in Pavan v. Smith.206 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a dispute regarding the right
of same-sex parents to have their names be listed on their child’s birth
certificates.207 An Arkansas state statute provided that when a couple was
married and the female spouse gave birth to a child via in vitro fertilization, her
male spouse’s name was placed on the birth certificate as the other parent of the
resulting child.208 Arkansas state officials refused to extend this right to nowmarried same-sex female couples and, as a result, the Court was forced to
intervene.209 The Court held that the statute had to be gender neutral in light of
the Court’s ruling in Obergefell, thereby mandating that the woman’s female
spouse have her name placed on the birth certificate as a parent of the child
conceived through in vitro fertilization.210
In addition to any animus concerning same-sex couples today, there still
exists, “the attitude towards the practice of surrogacy both inside and outside the
U.S. [that] . . . is still ambivalent at best, and many researchers and judges oppose
freedom of contract concerning this issue.”211 Objections to surrogacy focus on
public policy prohibiting trafficking of babies, prohibitions against taking
Id. at 289.
Zalesne, supra note 20, at 433-34.
204 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution prohibited states from denying same-sex couples
the right to enter into marriage).
205 Rachel Wexler, Artificial Reproductive Technology and Gendered Nations of
Parenthood After Obergefell: Analyzing the Legal Assumptions That Shaped the Baby M
Case and the Hodge-Podge Nature of Current Surrogacy Law, 27 TUL. J. L. & SEXUALITY 1,
4-5 (2018).
206 See Pavan, 137 S.Ct. at 2078 (2017).
207 Id. at 2076-77.
208 ARK. CODE § 20-18-401 (e), (f) (2016).
209 See Pavan, 137 S.Ct. at 2078 (2017).
210 Id. at 2077.
211 Yehezkel Margalit, In Defense of Surrogacy Agreements: A Modern Contract Law
Perspective, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423, 429 (2014).
202
203
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children from parents, and concerns over the capacity or voluntariness of persons
entering into surrogacy contracts.212 One author summarized the issues with
surrogacy as follows:
Because surrogacy contracts deal with elementary human rights, which
are of high personal and social importance, any rigid enforcement of
such contracts or total withdrawal from them may cause damage that is
detrimental to the sides. Similarly, every considered solution, such as
monetary refund or compensation, which may be appropriate in the
commercial context, is irrelevant in the intimate context of surrogacy
contracts since the sole goal of the agreement is the birth of a child and
the establishment of that child’s legal parenthood. Likewise, we should
not forget that the subject of such agreement is a child whose interests
and rights could be badly damaged should the parties be unable to reach
a just compromise.213
Nonetheless, there is the suggestion that evidence “demonstrates the recent shift
and accelerated social and legal acceptance of the surrogacy practice.”214 If
attitudes toward surrogacy are changing, then “the dilemma now centers on the
question of how to execute such contracts in the best possible way in order to
maximize their feasibility and durability at the state, federal, and international
levels.”215
Comments to the newly revised UPA (2017) illustrate the tentative acceptance
of surrogacy contracts among the states, particularly genetic or traditional
surrogacy, which involves the woman using her own gametes.216 As this Article
will discuss, the revised UPA, while recognizing “the controversial nature of
surrogacy itself,”217 takes note that more “states address surrogacy by statute,
and more people are having children through surrogacy.”218 Technological
advances during the recent decades have made surrogacy an option for persons
and couples, which the states gradually accommodate through revised statutes.
But the process is fraught with challenge and scrutiny.

Id.
Id.
214 Id. at 437; see also Zalesne, supra note 20, at 428 (citing Anne R. Dana, The State of
Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 353, 373-74, 376 (2011) (“Surrogacy is becoming more widely accepted in the
United States each year.”).
215 Zalesne, supra note 20, at 438.
216 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 904 cmt.; Yvonne M. Warlen, The Renting of the Womb: An
Analysis of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts Under Missouri Contract Law, 62 UMKC L.
REV. 583, 592-93 (1994).
217 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt.
218 Id.
212
213
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B. Challenge and Scrutiny
1. Heightened Scrutiny
When the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Constitution
guaranteed same-sex couples the right to enter into marriage, the Court
mandated that same-sex couples be treated equally with opposite-sex couples.219
Commensurate with the Supreme Court’s decision, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws enacted a 2017 revision of the UPA that,
among other revisions, amended the Act’s provisions so that they “address and
apply equally to same-sex couples.220 These changes include broadening the
presumptions, acknowledgement, genetic testing, and assisted reproduction
articles to make them gender neutral.”221 Prior versions of the Act distinguished
between paternity and maternity and created different mechanisms for
establishing each one. “Not only did this distinction erect different rules for men
and women, but it also reinforced the notion that some inherent difference exists
between mothers and fathers.”222 To illustrate, all states have what is referred to
as a marital presumption, which provides that a child born to a married woman
is presumptively the child of that woman’s husband, not that woman’s wife.223
This was the issue illustrated in the Pavan decision.224 “The UPA addresses this
potential constitutional infirmity by making the marital presumption expressly
apply equally to both male and female spouses of the woman who gave birth.”225
International surrogacy, especially in Thailand and Mexico, has become an
option for couples and individuals seeking to become parents through
arrangements with foreign women willing to carry a child to term.226 Currently,
there is debate over monitoring international surrogacy, but most often the
debate centers on the legality of the surrogacy contract and not the practice

See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, art. 8 prefatory note; see Leslie Joan Harris, Obergefell’s
Ambiguous Impact on Legal Parentage, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 66 (2017).
221 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, prefatory note (2017).
222 Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the UPA (2017), 127 YALE L. J.
F. 589, 606 (2018).
223 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE RIGHTS OF
PRESUMED (PUTATIVE) FATHERS: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS (2007).
224 Pavan, 137 S.Ct. at 2078-79 (2017).
225 Joslin, supra note 225, at 609.
226 See generally Adeline A. Allen, Surrogacy and Limitations to Freedom of Contract:
Toward Being More Fully Human, 41 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 753, 759, 769-70 (2018)
(arguing that surrogacy contracts should be invalid as contrary to public policy); but see
Sharmila Rudrappa, Why Is India’s Ban on Commercial Surrogacy Bad for Women?, 43
N.C. J. INT’L L. 70, 93 (2018) (arguing that surrogacy is a valid form of employment for
women and should be permitted).
219
220
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itself.227 Understandably, scrutiny of foreign contracts will intensify as
countries, such as India, ban the practice of international surrogacy, and cases
arise of economic coercion of young women or now, because of further
technological advances, sex-based selection of embryos. This new technology is
called pre-implementation genetics (PGD) and involves a procedure “by which
an embryologist removes one cell from an eight-cell embryo and tests that cell
for the presence of genetic defects.”228 However, what are the limits on this
technology? Gender selection and designer babies are matters of concern.
Proposals will be put forth by academics and legislatures, but as technology
advances, the law is slow to meet the challenges posed. The international arena
will offer possibilities not available in the United States and this will precipitate
added scrutiny of what develops.
Finally, not only in reference to surrogacy, but also pertinent to other forms
of ART, scientific advancements “could allow two women to create a child
without any male genetic contribution, or six parents to all contribute genetically
to the creations of a child.”229 This technological advance is at the heart of the
mitochondrial replacement evolution and involves, in addition, the parameters
of posthumous conception.230 Just as surrogacy challenged traditional notions of
parenthood, the possibility of a child with more than two parents—genetically
or behaviorally—has arrived, prompting new issues:
Do all parents, whatever their numbers, acquire equal parental standing,
with equal liability for child support and equal standing to seek custody
and visitation? If they do, how should the courts apply such principles?
Should they seek to equalize child support obligations and custody and
visitation rights in accordance with the parents’ ability to provide for
227 See, e.g., Sarah Mortazavi, It Takes a Village to Make a Child: Creating Guidelines
for International Surrogacy, 100 Geo. L. J. 2249, 2252 (2012); Barbara Stark,
Transnational Surrogacy and International Human Rights Law, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 369, 370 (2012); Richard Storrow, “The Phantom Children of the Republic”:
International Surrogacy and the New Illegitimacy, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
561, 595-96 (2012); Brock A. Patton, Buying a Newborn: Globalization and the Lack of
Federal Regulation of Commercial Surrogacy Contracts, 79 UMKC L. REV. 507, 528
(2010); Katherine Drabiak et al., Ethics, Law and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for
Uniformity, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 300, 301 (2007).
228 See Aziza Ahmed, Race and Assisted Reproduction: Implications for Population
Health, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2801, 2807-08 (2018); see also Tara R. Melillo, Gene Editing
and the Rise of Designer Babies, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 757, 759 (2017); Molina B.
Dayal, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, EMEDICINE (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://emedicine.medscape.com/article/273415-overview.
229 Margalit et al., supra note 36, at 107 (the advances in stem cell and somatic cell
nuclear transfer technologies can allow for more genetic modifications or alterations).
230 See Robert Klitzman et al., Controversies concerning mitochondrial replacement
therapy, NCBI (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4505924/
(explaining mitochondrial replacement therapy and then doctors “playing god”).
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the child or should they take other approaches?231
Two commentators suggest that when a child has multiple parents, the
“recognition [of parental rights is] to be hierarchical, rather than equal, in
relationships.232 The hierarchical structure presumes that a child’s best interest
lies in the stability found in a relationship with a primary parent, and that other
parents should receive physical custodial awards only to the extent that it does
not undermine the relationship with the primary parent.233 Increasingly, this
debate over the rights of multiple parents will become clearer as there are more
cases presented before courts for judicial resolution.
2. Parameters of Scrutiny
A perennial issue with surrogacy contracts is what is often termed as the
unequal power of the contracting parties.234 Technology has made it possible for
someone in the developed world to transfer a gamete to a surrogate in the
developing world for purposes of becoming a parent as a result of that
developing world surrogate’s gestational labors.235 The scenario is fraught with
issues of conscionability. There are those who decide that a fair contract is
impossible and have banned surrogacy.236 However, for others, a surrogacy
contract “should be seen as legitimate and enforceable, but premised upon a
regulated, narrower notion of freedom of contract in order to protect the public
interest.”237 The manner in which this protection will be provided is “through a
variety of doctrines, the most relevant being: trust, fairness, reasonableness,
good faith, increased disclosure obligation, consideration of the reliance interest
of the other party and his individual needs, and unconscionability.”238 The most
important of these factors is unconscionability. “Using this doctrine, courts
weigh the fairness of the bargain when the contract was signed from both
procedural and substantive aspects.”239
231 June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Parents, Babies, and More Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 9, 10 (2017) (arguing that equal status among all parents does not follow from parental
recognition).
232 Id. at 46.
233 Id.
234 Margalit, supra note 214, at 430-31.
235 See Jessica M. Caamano, International, Commercial, Gestational Surrogacy through
the Eyes of Children Born to Surrogates in Thailand: A Cry for Legal Attention, 96 B.U. L.
REV. 571, 574 (2016).
236 See, e.g., Rosecky v. Schissel, 349 Wis. 2d 634, 659 n.17 (Wis. 2013).
237 Margalit, supra note 214, at 440.
238 Id. at 445 (listing the following as grounds for unconscionability: fraud, lack of
capacity, undue influence, duress, gross inequality of bargaining power, inability to read or
understand the provisions of the agreement, a significant gap in age, intelligence or
education, or unfair surprise).
239 Id. at 446 (referencing Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts:
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As the law grapples with an increasing number of people utilizing surrogacy,
plus the expansion of technological options, legislatures address the parameters
of scrutiny.240 Some will ban genetic (traditional) surrogacy, and some will ban
both genetic and gestational surrogacy. However, some groups such as the
National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, will posit benchmarks of what
appear to be conscionable based on current circumstances.241 The core factors to
determine conscionability include: (1) age of the surrogate and intended parents;
(2) adequate medical and mental health evaluation of the surrogate and intended
parents; (3) independent legal representation for both the surrogate and the
intended parents; (4) grounds and a process of rescission; (5) means of
establishing parenthood; and (6) consideration and payment of expenses.242
There are too many variables to consider for one set of parameters. For
example, it is important to note that the States and the UPA both impose
additional requirements on surrogacy agreements when the surrogate uses her
own gametes, which is referred to as a genetic or traditional surrogacy.243 To
illustrate, the UPA allows a genetic surrogate to withdraw her consent up until
72 hours after birth.244 Additionally, to be enforceable, “a genetic surrogacy
agreement must be validated by the [designated court], and the proceeding to
validate the agreement must be commenced before assisted reproduction related
to the surrogacy agreement.”245
In those jurisdictions permitting surrogacy, standard eligibility requirements

Adhesion and Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123, 155-61 (2005)).
240 New Jersey Gestational Carrier Agreement Act of 2018, 9 N.J.S.A §§17-60 (2018);
Linda S. Anderson, Legislative Oppression: Restricting Gestational Surrogacy to Married
Couples Is an Attempt to Legislate Morality, 42 U. OF BALT. L. REV. 611, 634 (2013).
241 See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code – The Emperor’s New
Clause, 115 U. OF PENN. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967); Deborah S. Mazer, Born Breach: The
Challenge of Remedies in Surrogacy Contracts, 28 YALE J. OF L. & FEMINISM 211, 218-19
(2017).
242 See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 802 (the Act requires the surrogate, genetic or
gestational, to be at least 21 years of age, previously have given birth to at least one child,
have a medical evaluation performed by a licensed medical doctor relating to the surrogacy
arrangement, complete a mental health consultation by a licensed mental health
professional, and have independent legal representation throughout the surrogacy
arrangement regarding the terms of the surrogacy agreement, and the potential legal
consequences of the agreement. In some states, the intended parents must pay for the
surrogate’s legal representation. Any intended parent, either genetically related or not, must
be at least 21 years of age, have a medical and a mental health examination done by either a
medical doctor or a licensed mental health professional, and have independent legal counsel
chosen by the intended parent throughout the surrogacy arrangement regarding the terms of
the agreement and the potential legal consequences).
243 Id. § 815.
244 Id. § 814(a)(2).
245 Id. § 813(a).
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are similar to the factors used to determine the validity of a contract, including
age of the parties, medical condition, adequate consent to the procedure, and
legal representation appear to be the standard eligibility requirements.246
Surrogacy agreements must also be signed and notarized prior to the medical
procedure in connection with the contemplated surrogacy.247 In addition, at least
one of the parties to the agreement must be a resident of the state where the
agreement is to be enforced.248 Also, the surrogacy agreement itself must contain
a clause in which the surrogate agrees to become pregnant by means of assisted
reproduction and both she and her spouse, if any, renounce any claim to the child
conceived, and that the intended parents agree to become the parents of the child
regardless of the number of children born or the gender, mental, or physical
condition of each child.249 At any time, the surrogate retains the right to make
her own health and welfare decisions regarding her pregnancy, including the
right to terminate the pregnancy itself.250
The intended parents must disclose in the agreement how they will pay for
the surrogacy arrangement plus the financial responsibility for the child or
children once born.251 Disclosure requirements are quite specific, including a
summary of health-care policy provisions, any third-party liability liens, other
insurance available, and any disclosure that could affect coverage or liability of
the surrogate.252 While not required, the agreement may specify for payment of
consideration, payment of reasonable expenses, and for reimbursement of
specific expenses if the agreement is terminated.253 Likewise, the agreement
must disclose any information about the right of any party to the agreement to
terminate the surrogacy agreement.254
In addition to the requirements listed by the UPA, other commentators suggest
246 See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 16-405, 16-405(a)(2), 16-406(3) (2017); MAINE PARENTAGE
ACT, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-a, § 1931 (2015); NEV. REV. CODE § 126.740 (2013); N.H. REV.
CODE § 168-B: 9 (2014).
247 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803(6)-(9),
248 Id. §§ 803(1) (“During the period after execution of a surrogacy agreement until 90
days after the birth of a child conceived by assisted reproduction under the agreement, a
court of this state conducting a proceeding under this [Act] has exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction over all matters arising out of the agreement.”).
249 Id. §§ 804(a)(1)-(4), 809(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) or
Section 810(b) or 812, on birth of a child conceived by assisted reproduction under a
gestational surrogacy agreement, each intended parent is, by operation of law, a parent of
the child.”).
250 Id. § 804(a)(7).
251 Id. § 804(a)(5).
252 Id. § 804(a)(6).
253 Id. § 804(b).
254 Id. §§ 804(a)(8), 808(a) (“A party to a gestational agreement may terminate the
agreement, at any time before or after an embryo transfer, by giving notice of termination in
a record to all other parties. If an embryo transfer does not result in a pregnancy, a party
may terminate the agreement at any time before a subsequent embryo transfer.”).
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that all parties receive social and psychological support during the contractual
period.255 Appropriate to the evolution of new technologies and the international
character of surrogacy, “state and federal legislatures create and publish an
accepted comprehensive form of standard surrogacy contract that includes
mandatory stipulations in order to avoid (to the extent possible) any acute
contractual problems that would abolish the legality and enforcement of
surrogacy contracts.”256 Currently, the revised UPA provides the most
comprehensive model of legislation.
III. POSTPONED CONCEPTION
A. Posthumous Conception
From the start of parenthood until the present time, women were pregnant and
the father of their child or children sometimes died prior to the birth of their
children, who were in gestation at the time of the father’s death. Children born
after the death of their parent, but in gestation at the death of that parent, are
referred to as a “posthumous birth.” There are statutory provisions prescribing
that such children are able to inherit as if they were alive at the death of the
decedent, but many statutes require the infants to survive a certain number of
days after birth.257 However, technological advances associated with ART have
enhanced this paradigm. First, since it is possible that a woman may
cryopreserve her gametes, it is now possible that a woman may predecease the
birth or conception of her own child.258 Therefore, posthumous birth may now
occur with women who die prior to their egg or eggs, implanted in a surrogate,
progressing toward a live birth.259 Second, both women and men may
cryopreserve gametes—eggs, sperm, or embryos—for conception and birth after
their death.260 This development is described as “posthumous conception.”261
Margalit, supra note 214, at 464.
Id. at 466.
257 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-104 (1969) (an individual in gestation at a
decedent’s death is deemed to be living at the decedent’s death if the individual lives 120
hours after birth. If it is not established by clear and convincing evidence that an individual
in gestation at the decedent’s death lived 120 hours after birth, it is deemed that the
individual failed to survive for the required time).
258 Raymond C. O’Brien, The Momentum of Posthumous Conception: A Model Act, 25 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 332, 333 (2009).
259 Daniel C. Perrone, Breaking the Ice: Expanding the Class of “Issue” to Include
Posthumously Conceived Children, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 369, 370 (2014).
260 Helene S. Shapo, Matters Of Life And Death: Inheritance Consequences Of
Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091, 1153 (1997).
261 Gloria L. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social
255
256
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The science is new, as is the discussion of any ethical implications.262
ART makes it possible for babies to be born without sexual intercourse.
Included within this technology is the ability to bring about conception of a
human baby after the death of the male or female donor of the gamete.263 It is
difficult to estimate how long the gamete may be cryopreserved prior to
commencing its final cycle leading to birth of a child. In 2009, ABC News
reported that a baby girl was born from a man’s frozen sperm that had been
cryopreserved for more than 22 years.264 More attention will be paid to long term
banking in the future, but at present, most facts involve a man or woman seeking
to become a parent in the not-too-distant future, usually with a current partner,
and therefore “banking” gametes for this purpose now.
In Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, one of the earliest cases
regarding posthumous conception, a man and a woman were married when the
couple was informed that the husband had leukemia and that necessary medical
treatments may leave him sterile.265 Thereupon the couple arranged for a
quantity of the man’s sperm to be withdrawn and cryopreserved for future use.266
Sadly, the man died of the disease shortly after his diagnosis, leaving behind his
wife and his cryopreserved sperm.267 Because the wife had access to the sperm,
she underwent artificial insemination using his sperm and subsequently gave
birth to twin girls in 1995.268 Three months later, the mother of the twins applied
for surviving child benefits on behalf of the twin girls from the Social Security
Administration.269 These benefits are allowed for the minor children of a
decedent parent qualified to take under the Social Security Act and permit the
children to receive monetary awards each month until turning majority.270
The mother’s application on behalf of the twins was denied by the Social
Security administrator because the federal benefits are contingent upon whether
the twins qualify as the husband’s children.271 To be his children they must be
Security Survivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
251, 258 (1999).
262 See, e.g., Katarina Lee, Ethical Considerations of Ovarian and Testicular Tissue
Cryopreservation in Pre-Pubertal Children Who Cannot Consent, 36 LAW & INEQ. 95, 95
(2018) (arguing that while parents and guardians normally have the best interests of their
wards in mind when they make medical decisions, pre-pubertal fertility cryopreservation is
ethically too problematic to permit parental or guardian consent without the child’s assent).
263 Banks, supra note 265, at 272-73.
264 See ROBERT H. SITKOFF AND JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 117
(10th ed. 2017).
265 Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002).
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 260 n. 3.
271 Id.
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entitled to inherit from his intestate estate under the laws of the husband’s
state.272 Thus, are children conceived after the death of a parent to be considered
as the decedent’s children?
Massachusetts, like most states at the time, never considered posthumous
conception.273 The state statute on intestacy was drafted and enacted long before
such technology became available. However, as the Massachusetts court pointed
out in its opinion, “Neither the statute’s ‘posthumous children’ provision . . . nor
any other provision of our intestacy law limits the class of posthumous children
to those in utero at the time of the decedent’s death.”274 Specifically, the
“Massachusetts intestacy statute thus does not contain an express, affirmative
requirement that posthumous children must “be in existence” as of the date of
the decedent’s death.”275 Based in part on the state’s statutory failure to require
that the baby be born or in utero in order to inherit from a decedent, the state’s
highest court ruled that the twins were eligible to inherit, thus making them
eligible to receive minor children survivorship Social Security benefits.276
While the silence of the state’s statute was a significant factor in the court’s
decision, the court stressed the importance of the best interest of children,277 the
technological advances made in the area of assisted reproductive technology,278
and the state’s concerns over the timely distribution of a decedent’s estate.279 As
do many of the state and federal courts, the Massachusetts court called upon the
legislature to address the advances in reproductive technology that generated the
issue involved.280
The Massachusetts court then ruled, based on common law principles and
existing state statutes:
[We] conclude that limited circumstances may exist, consistent with the
mandates of our Legislature, in which posthumously conceived children
may enjoy the inheritance rights of “issue” under our intestacy law. These
limited circumstances exist where, as a threshold matter, the surviving
parent or the child’s other legal representative demonstrates a genetic
relationship between the child and the decedent. The survivor or
representative must then establish both that the decedent affirmatively
consented to posthumous conception and to the support of any resulting
child. Even where such circumstances exist, time limitations may preclude
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280

Id. at 260 n. 4.
Id.
Id. at 262, citing then applicable MASS. G.L. c. 190, § 8.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 265.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 272.
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commencing a claim for succession rights on behalf of a posthumously
conceived child. In any action brought to establish such inheritance rights,
notice must be given to all interested parties.281
This Massachusetts decision was the first of many involving guardians applying
for Social Security survivorship benefits on behalf of children conceived
posthumously. The response of other state courts, based solely on more
restrictive state inheritance statutes, was to deny the benefits because the
children could not inherit from the decedent’s estate under intestate
succession.282 In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States entered the fray
and confirmed that the wording of the Social Security Act was operative and that
a posthumously conceived child is eligible for Social Security survivorship
benefits, but only if that child would be an intestate heir of the predeceasing
parent.283 Gradually, uniform commissions and state legislatures are enacting
legislation to accommodate posthumous conception.284
B. Statutory Framework
Today, more than a quarter of the states have enacted legislation specifically
governing posthumous conception, but there has yet to be an approved model
act.285 Indeed, even though legislation has acknowledged the technological
advances occurring through assisted reproduction, the parameters of the statutes
vary. The revised UPA (2017) provides that an individual who, (1) consents in
a record to assisted reproduction, (2) dies prior to transfer of gametes or
embryos, that individual is a parent of the resulting child only if, (3) the record
states that the individual consented to parenthood through posthumous
conception or there is clear and convincing evidence providing the individual’s
intent.286 In addition, (4) the embryo must be in utero not later than 36 months
after the decedent’s death or the child is born not later than 45 months after the
decedent’s death.287
The approach of the UPA is meant to be consistent with the Uniform Probate
Code (UPC). The UPC provides that an individual is a parent of a child of
assisted reproduction even though the child is conceived after the individual’s

Id.
Nicole M. Barnard, Astrue v. Capato: Relegating Posthumously Conceived Children
to Second-Class Citizens, 72 MD. L. REV. 1039, 1052 (2013).
283 Astrue v. Capato, 566 U.S. 541, 559 (2012); Barnard, supra note 286, at 1039-40.
284 CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (2006); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708; O’Brien, supra note
262, at 356.
285 See generally O’Brien, supra note 288 at 375-76 n.195-97; see, e.g., CAL. PROB.
CODE § 249.5.
286 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708.
287 Id.
281
282
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death as long as the child is either in utero no later than 36 months after the
individual’s death or born not later than 45 months after the individual’s
death.288 The child is treated as in gestation at the time of the individual’s death
and must still survive for five days after birth.289 To qualify as a parent through
posthumous conception, there must be a record establishing the decedent’s
consent or, in the absence of this, clear and convincing evidence of the same.290
State statutes may vary slightly from the uniform acts cited.291 For example,
California provides for posthumous conception by requiring that such a child be
treated as if born during the lifetime of the decedent if there is clear and
convincing evidence of the following: (1) in writing, signed and dated, the
decedent specifies that his or her genetic materials was to be used for
posthumous conception, (2) the writing may be revoked or amended if signed
and dated, (3) the decedent designates a person to control the use of the genetic
materials, (4) notice is given to this person within four months of the decedent’s
death, and (5) the intended child was in utero within two years of death.292
Current legislation seeks to balance the right of a person to procreate,293 even
posthumously, with the need for the state to accommodate speedy administration
of estates and distribution of any concomitant benefits. Future technological

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k).
Id.; see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-115 (providing definitions of persons
qualifying as a parent).
290 Id. § 2-120(f).
291 See C. Raymond Radigan & David R. Schoenhaar, Statutory Inheritance Rights of a
Posthumously Conceived Child, 253 N.Y.L. J. (Jan. 12, 2015) (stating that New York now
joins 20 other states permitting a statutory solution to inheritance rights for posthumously
conceived children); compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (4) (2018) (“A child conceived
from the eggs or sperm of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs,
sperm, or preembryos to a woman’s body shall not be eligible for a claim against the
decedent’s estate unless the child has been provided for by the decedent’s will”); with
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-785(a) (2014) (“For purposes of determining rights to
property to be distributed upon the death of a decedent, a child of the decedent conceived
and born after the death of the decedent shall be deemed to have been born in the lifetime of
the decedent and after the execution of all of the decedent’s testamentary instruments, if: (1)
The decedent executed a written document that: (A) Specifically set forth that his sperm or
her eggs may be used for the posthumous conception of a child, (B) specifically provided
his or her spouse with authority to exercise custody, control and use of the sperm or eggs in
the event of his or her death, and (C) was signed and dated by the decedent and the
surviving spouse; and (2) The child posthumously conceived using the decedent’s sperm or
eggs was in utero not later than one year after the date of death of the decedent spouse.”).
292 See CAL. P ROB. CODE § 249.5.
293 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (“a right which is basic to the
perpetuation of a race-the right to have offspring”); Greer Gaddie, The Personhood
Movement’s Effect on Assisted Reproductive Technology: Balancing Interests Under a
Presumption of Embryonic Personhood, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1305-06 (2018) (suggesting
that Skinner contributed to what would be described as the right to privacy).
288
289
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developments may outpace the current statutes, as the pace of legislative
enactments is slow to accommodate evolving technologies. Hence, statutes that
limit birth of a child to two or three years may seriously jeopardize the
decedent’s fundamental right to procreate should science be able to “bank” his
or her gametes for longer and longer periods of time.294 Because these statutes
are meant to establish foreseeable entitlement to benefits, such as inheritance
claims, dynastic legacies, and federal benefits such as those illustrated in the
Woodward decision, ambivalence in statutory language will inhibit the orderly
administration of estates.295 Inheritance is not only about a time frame for
inheritance, it is about who may inherit within that time frame too.
Technology will continue to challenge even recently modified parameters of
parenthood. Many of these challenges may involve postponed conception too.
As one commentator illustrates, and as this Article will address in the next
section, the “ability to create a child from two women, two men, or multiple
parents emerges from two developing technologies, somatic cell nuclear transfer
(SCNT) and stem cell technology.”296 The commentator describes the process
as follows: “SCNT entails removing the original nucleus from an egg (which is
then knows as an ‘enucleated egg’) and replacing the nucleus with nuclear
material from one or more individuals and sources. After being induced to divide
in a laboratory, the embryo, also knows as a blastocyst, is then implanted into a
uterus and allowed to gestate to form a complete organism.”297 Similarly,
advances “in reproductive medicine, such as uterine transplantation, animalhuman chimeric technology, and artificial wombs, may obviate the need for a
female gestational mother in the future.”298 Indeed, the “success of uterine
transplantation in sheep, dogs, and mice, the initiation of human uterine
transplantation scheduled in the United Kingdom and Sweden, and the various
other planned attempts to pursue human uterine transplantation raise the
294 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-785(a) (2014); Susan C. Stevenson-Popp,”I Have Loved
you in my Dreams”: Posthumous Reproduction and the Need for Change in the Uniform
Parentage Act, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 727, 728–29 (2003) (explaining “Through the use of
advanced reproductive technology, children have been born using sperm up to ten years
after the sperm was originally preserved.”); see, e.g., IOWA CODE § 633.220A (2011).
295 See Bruce A. Fowler & Teresa C. Baird, Frozen in Time: Planning for the
Posthumously Conceived Child, 37 COLO. LAW. 45, 47 (2008) (outlining how one court
acknowledged the “struggle to balance the finality and certainty of
administration of estates with the rights of children born as a result of scientific advances.”).
296 Margalit et al., supra note 36, at 117; see also Karita Shah Asora and Valerie Blake,
Uterus Transplantation: Ethical and Regulatory Challenge, J. MED. ETHICS 396, 396-97
(2013) (providing an update on the procedure).
297 Margalit et al., supra note 36, at 117 (citing Erez Aloni, Cloning and the LGBT
Family: Cautious Optimism, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 3-7 (2011)); David
Orentichler, Beyond Cloning: Expanding Reproductive Options for Same-Sex Couples, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 651, 653 (2001).
298 Margalit et al., supra note 36, at 125.
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possibility that one day a uterus could be transplanted into a man.”299 It remains
to be seen, but, as was true with surrogacy, the acceptance of uterine
transplantation may well occur because of its utilization by the LGBTQ
community.300
Currently the debate occurring among commentators is over parental rights
and responsibilities toward the child, duties of support, and associated claims of
parentage.301 Which persons may become parents? But there is another side to
the equation: from whom may a child take when a decedent dies survived by
that child? Inheritance occurs because of defined–often traditionally defined—
rules based on blood or adoption.302 There are few exceptions, one being when
a child is born via in vitro fertilization,303 and the other is when a child is born
to a gestational carrier, such as a surrogate.304 These exceptions, both permitting
inheritance by someone not related through blood or adoption, are premised
upon defined circumstances precipitating inheritance.305 Other than when a
decedent has been prescient enough to execute a valid last will and testament,
inheritance is premised upon state intestate statutes and these are, as the cases
readily illustrate, slow to incorporate the technological advances made by
assisted reproductive technology.
IV. MULTIPLE GENETIC PARENTS
A. Functional Parenthood
The concept of family, parent, and even marriage continues to evolve. Today,
this evolution embraces the concept of multiple parents for the same child or
children.306 Traditionally, when a child is adopted by a non-genetic person, or
Id.
See Seema Mohapatra, Assisted Reproduction Inequality and Marriage Equality, 92
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 88 (2017); but see Michael Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT
Right?, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1065, 1066, 1124 (2016) (arguing for a critique of the rightsbased claims of equality and of procreative liberty that permeate LGBTQ arguments about
assisted reproduction).
301 See also Margalit et al., supra note 36, at 138 (arguing for preauthorized surrogacy
contracts in which parties utilizing ART could delineate the rights and obligations of the
various parties); see, e.g., Carbone & Cahn, supra note 235, at 10, 12 (arguing for
hierarchical status among persons claiming parental status).
302 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(a)(1).
303 Id. § 2-120(a).
304 Id. § 2-121.
305 Id. § 2-103 cmt.; see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-121.
306 Michael S. Deprince, Same-Sex Marriage and Disestablishing Parentage:
Reconceptualizing Legal Parenthood Through Surrogacy, 100 MINN. L. REV. 797, 811-12
(2015).
299
300
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persons, the adoption severs the relationship between the child and that child’s
genetic parents.307 However, gradually parents of children wanted their current
spouses to share a committed family relationship with children from other
partners or spouses. The law accommodated this by permitting a stepparent to
adopt a stepchild but retain a modicum of rights in the non-custodial parent.308
The effect of this is to retain the rights of both genetic parents and to include the
rights of a third parent, the former stepparent.309 There are three restrictions to
effectuate the granting of such rights. First, there must be a valid marriage
between the genetic parent and his or her spouse to initiate stepparent
adoption.310 Second, the other genetic parent (the one not married to the
stepparent) must agree to the stepparent’s adoption of his or her genetic child.311
Unless the other genetic parent agrees, there can be no stepparent adoption.312
Third, statutes limit the right of the other genetic parent, the non-spouse, to
inherit from or through the child in the event that the child should die intestate.313
However, the child may still inherit from or through that genetic parent.314
The UPC creates another parental status, a person who has “functioned as a
parent of the child.”315 However, this status refers to a doctrine known as
307 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE ART. II § 2-119(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in
subsections (b) through (e), a parent-child relationship does not exist between and adoptee
and the adoptee’s genetic parents.”).
308 See id. § 2-119(b) (1) - (2) (“A parent-child relationship exists between an individual
who is adopted by the spouse of either genetic parent and: the genetic parent whose spouse
adopted the individual; and the other genetic parent, but only for the purpose of the right of
the adoptee or a descendant of the adoptee to inherit from or through the other genetic
parent.”).
309 See id. § 2-119(b)(1) - (2).
310 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, STEPPARENT
ADOPTION (2013) (explaining how “some states will not approve a stepparent adoption
unless you [as the stepparent] have been married to the child’s parent.”).
311 Id. (stating that if one wants to adopt a stepchild, he or she must have the consent of
both his or her spouse and “the child’s other parent (the noncustodial parent), unless that
parent has abandoned the child”).
312 See e.g., In re Adoption of GLV, 190 P.3d 245, 262 (Kan. 2008) (holding that even
the best interest of the child does not preclude consent by the genetic parent to the
adoption).
313 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119 cmt. b (stating that section 2-119(b)(2) does not allow
the non-custodial genetic parent and his or her relatives to inherit through the adopted
stepchild).
314 Id. (“Section 2-119(b)(2) provides that a parent-child relationship also continues to
exist between an adopted stepchild and his or her other genetic parent (the noncustodial
genetic parent) for purposes of inheritance from and through that genetic parent.”).
315 Id. § 2-115(4) (“‘Functioned as a parent of the child’ means behaving toward a child
in a manner consistent with being the child’s parent and performing functions that are
customarily performed by a parent, including fulfilling parental responsibilities toward the
child, recognizing or holding out the child as the individual’s child, materially participating
in the child’s upbringing, and residing with the child in the same household as a regular
member of that household.”).
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equitable adoption. “Equitable adoption is not adoption. Rather, it is an equity
device, sometimes called ‘virtual adoption’ or ‘adoption by estoppel,’ by which
the courts permit an intended heir to share in the intestate estate of a
decedent.”316 The majority of states permit a person to inherit intestate – there is
an absence of a valid last will and testament—from an individual when certain
conditions are met, such as the decedent “functioned as a parent of the child.”317
Hence, functioning as a parent is more of an inheritance device for persons with
no genetic or adoptive connection but who have been treated as a child by the
decedent for a sufficient period of time.318
There are other models granting parental status. For example, the “American
Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution and an increasing
number of states provide recognition to adults who have assumed parental roles
without a biological tie to the child, in some cases on the basis of function alone
and in other cases on the basis of a combination of intent, assumption of a
parental role, and/or the consent of the initial legal parent.”319 Function serves
to establish parenthood whenever adults who, though not otherwise legal
parents, have assumed a parental role “as part of a prior co-parenting agreement
with the child’s legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents).”320
The second category is de facto parent, defined as someone who:
(1) Lived with the child for a significant period of time not less than two
years; (2) with the agreement of the legal parent; (3) primarily to form a
parent-child relationship and not primarily for financial compensation, or
316 RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN & MICHAEL T. FLANNERY, DECEDENTS’ ESTATES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 118 (3d ed. 2016).
317 See, e.g., DeHart v. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d 85, 104 (2013) (quoting “A plaintiff must
prove an equitable adoption claim to recover against an estate by clear and convincing
evidence. Moreover, the decedent’s intent to adopt and form a close and enduring familial
relationship must be clear and conclusive. And it must not be just as readily harmonizable
with the mere intention to provide a good home, but must instead indicate a clear intent to
adopt or to continuously represent to the plaintiff and the world at large that the plaintiff was
the decedent’s natural child.”); but see In re Estate of Scherer, 336 P.3d 129, 133 (Wyo.
2014) (stating that “Wyoming does not recognize the doctrine of equitable adoption” and
thus an unrelated individual cannot inherit from a decedent’s intestate estate pursuant to the
doctrine, but that ‘‘the majority of states recognize equitable adoption in one form or
another… [and] the application of the doctrine has been limited to intestate estates.”).
318 See Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604, 606-07 (N.C. 1997) (listing the specific
conditions for equitable adoption: (1) “an express or implied agreement to adopt the child;
(2) reliance on the agreement; (3) performance by the natural parents of the child in giving
up custody; (4) performance by the child in living in the home of the foster parts and acting
as their child; (5) partial performance by the foster parents in the taking of the child into
their home and treating the child as their own; and (6) the intestacy of the foster parent.”).
319 Carbone & Cahn, supra note 235, at 14.
320 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(b)(iii), (Ira M. Ellman et al. eds., 2002).
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as a result of a legal parent’s complete failure to perform caretaking
functions; and (4) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking
functions for the child or regularly performed a share of caretaking
functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child
primarily lived.321
Professors of law, Carbone and Cahn, argue that the LGBTQ community
began to use the concept of intent to establish parenthood, sometimes augmented
with function.322 As with the gradual acceptance of surrogacy in the overall
population, “[LGBTQ] advocates have been in the forefront of efforts to gain
recognition of more than two parents in part because they have consciously
fought to create alternate models that better fit their circumstances.”323
Nonetheless, not all of categories of what has come to be called parents share
equal parenting rights. “While a parent by estoppel occupies a status comparable
to that of a legal parent, de facto parents do not. A de facto parent, for example,
cannot receive primary physical custodial responsibility if a fit legal parent is
able and willing to take such responsibility.”324
Finally, in its 2017 revision to the UPA, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws included a provision for the
establishment of a “de facto parent” as a legal parent of a child.325 The
Commissioners included this provision because of similar enactments, judicially
and legislatively, among some of the states, “ranging from Massachusetts, to
West Virginia, to North and South Carolina, to Texas.”326 Some states use
different terms rather than de facto parent, such as “in loco parentis,” or
“psychological parents.”327 If a petitioner has formed a bonded and dependent
parent-child relationship with a child, then this individual may be recognized as
a legal parent.328
For de facto parentage to be established under the UPA, the petition must be
filed during the lifetime of the petitioner and the child, and before the child turns
Id. § 2.03(1)(c).
Carbone & Cahn, supra note 235, at 14 n.27.
323 Id. at 17.
324 Id. at 25.
325 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609; see also DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2003)
(amended 2013) (explaining how de facto parent status is established); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
19-a, § 1891 (2016) (discussing how a “court may adjudicate a person to be a de facto
parent”).
326 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, prefatory note.
327 See, e.g., Bethany v. Jones, 378 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Ark. 2011) (“Jones argued that she
did stand in loco parentis and that there was ample statutory authority for awarding her
custody of the child on that basis.”); McAllister v. McAllister, 779 N.W.2d 652, 658 (N.D.
2010) (describing a psychological parent as “a person who provides a child’s daily care and
who, thereby, develops a close bond and personal relationship with the child [and] becomes
the psychological parent to whom the child turns for love, guidance, and security”).
328 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 cmt.
321
322
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18 years of age.329 There is a two-stage process to establish de facto parenthood.
Assuming that the petitioner can establish a preponderance of the evidence330
and that he or she or they qualify as de facto parents, there can be an adjudication
as to whether the petitioner can establish the following facts:
(1) the individual resided with the child as a regular member of the
child’s household for a significant period;
(2) the individual engaged in consistent caretaking for the child;
(3) the individual undertook full and permanent responsibilities of a
parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation;
(4) the individual held out the child as the individual’s child;
(5) the individual established a bonded and dependent relationship with
the child which is parental in nature;
(6) another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and
dependent relationship required under paragraph (5); and
(7) continuing the relationship between the individual and the child is
in the best interest of the child.331
There are similarities between the UPA and the de facto provision offered by
the American Law Institute (ALI). However, note there are differences too. First,
note the absence of a time duration in the UPA, as there is in the ALI.332 Second,
the UPA requires that the petitioner resided with the child as a regular member
of the child’s household for a significant period of time.333 Third, the UPA
mandates that any claimant must, as an initial matter, provide at least a
preponderance of the evidence that he or she or they can meet the seven elements
required by the statute.334 “This requirement is included to ensure that permitting
proceedings by de facto parents does not subject parents to unwarranted and
unjustified litigation.”335 Fourth, the petitioner, with the encouragement of the
parent, formed a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is
parental in nature.336 Fifth, only the petitioner may petition to become a de facto
parent, thereby denying the right to any third party, such as the state, which may
be seeking to obtain child support from a stepparent.337
All of the efforts to establish parental status outside of adoption or a genetic
Id. § 6-609(a)(1), (b).
Id. § 609(c)(3).
331 Id. § 609(d)(1)-(7).
332 Id. § 609(d)(1) (requiring only a “significant period” of time); PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY
LAW DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(c) (Am. L. Inst. 2002)
(requiring a two-year time duration requirement to establish a de facto parent relationship).
333 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609(d)(1).
334 Id. § 609(c)(3).
335 Id. § 609 cmt.
336 Id. § 609(d)(5)-(6).
337 Id. § 609 cmt. (“[t]his section permits only the individual alleging himself or herself
to be a de facto parent to initiate a proceeding under this section.”).
329
330
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connection rest upon the premise that, “actual parent-child bonds are important
to children and that these relationships are worthy of protection.”338 The fact that
the de facto parent relationship may come into existence after the birth of the
child and is applied in gender-neutral terms is innovative.339 Addressing parental
rights and responsibilities inherent in this status, at least one commentator
suggests that de facto parents “stand in parity with any other legal parents,
including genetic parents, for all purposes.”340 The full parameters of these
relationships remain to be determined.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the arguments concerning the
rights of genetic and functional parents, but this debate will continue as more
claims occur based on non-genetic parental grounds.341 Furthermore, because
of technological advances, future debate must involve the possibility that a child
now may have more than two genetic parents.342 Previous discussion of
stepparent adoption, equitable adoption, and the permeations of de facto
parenthood offer context to what has already a reality, in vitro fertilization and
a mitochondrial/nuclear transfer path to multiple genetic parenthood.
B. Mitochondrial Transfer
On April 6, 2016, a baby boy was born in Mexico City as a result of a
procedure known as MRT,343 the birth involving genetic material from not two,
but three different people.344 This procedure, MRT, and the resulting birth of a
healthy baby mark a technological development of significant proportions as
until then, “every child begins with two (and only two) suppliers of genetic
material and one (and only one) gestational carrier.”345 While the purpose of
MRT is to avoid the transmission of mitochondrial disease, a serious illness, the
technology used involves the paradigm of human parentage, human genetics,
and thus social consequences. The consequences occur because MRT donations
challenge “prevailing cultural assumptions about the symbolic and biological

Joslin, supra note 225, at 600.
Id. at 601.
340 Id. at 602.
341 See, e.g., Casey et al., supra note 15, at 94-97; Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity:
Intentional Parenthood’s Promise, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 465, 469 (2016); Katherine Baker,
Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 652-53 (2008).
342 Margalit et al., supra note 36, at 109.
343 Newton et al., supra note 13 at 589 (noting that interventions to alter mitochondria
have many names, among them “mitochondrial donation, mitochondrial replacement,
mitochondrial therapy, mitochondrial transfer, and three-parent IVF”).
344 See Green, supra note 27 at 251.
345 Lynda Wray Black, The Birth of a Parent: Defining Parentage for Lenders of Genetic
Material, 92 NEB. L. REV. 799, 812 (2014).
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significance of genetic material.”346
A woman who carries mitochondrial disease risks a difficult pregnancy and
the birth of a child with the serious effects of that disease.347 While it is possible
for a woman to become a parent in other ways than using her own gametes and
carrying the child to term, such as adoption or the use of donor eggs, the use of
MRT permits a woman to have a genetic connection with her child. There are
those who argue that genetic affinity is of sufficient importance and that it
justifies expending private and public funds to make the procedure accessible to
persons seeking to utilize its benefits.348 Others argue that since “human oocytes
are essential to promising stem-cell technologies that would treat serious
conditions—including Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s, and indeed
mitochondrial disease itself—allocation of this scarce resource to three-parent
IVF is unjustified.”349 Indeed, this commentator argues that the technology does
not meet a plausible social-value standard to render public research investment
into its development. She reports that mitochondrial diseases are too rare to
justify the expenditure. “If the incidence is one in 4,000 cases per birth, then
roughly 80,000 Americans are affected. This is far below the threshold
commonly used in the United States to define a disease as rare; by that standard,
fewer than 200,000 people are affected.”350
Implicit in the debate over funding of MRT, is the fact that the procedure and
resulting live birth of a healthy baby illustrates that it is possible to add the
genetic material of a third party—in addition to the gestational mother and the
father—to create a child with three genetic parents.351 This is the technological
innovation that will generate controversy, this and the question of what comes
next.
1. Procedure
The procedure involving genetic material from three persons to create a child
was developed to permit “a woman with a mitochondrial disorder to give birth
to healthy children by pairing her nuclear DNA with the healthy mitochondria

346 Rebecca Dimond and Neil Stephens, Three Persons, Three Genetic Contributors,
Three Parents: Mitochondrial Donation, Genetic Parenting and the Immutable Grammar of
the ‘Three x x’, HEALTH 5 (2017).
347 AMEL KARAA ET AL., EFFECTS OF MITOCHONDRIAL DISEASE/DYSFUNCTION ON
PREGNANCY: A RETROSPECTIVE STUDY 3-4 (2018).
348 See, e.g., Schaefer & Labude, supra note 31, at 1579.
349 See Tina Rulli, What is the Value of Three-Parent IVF?, 46 HASTING CTR. REP. 38, 44
(2016).
350 Id. at 43.
351 Id. at 38.
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from a donor’s egg.”352 Medical findings suggest that
mtDNA is passed on from the egg, all children from affected women
inherit these mitochondrial mutations . . . by removing the nuclear DNA
from the target egg’s defective mtDNA and placing it within a donated
egg with healthy mtDNA . . . so that the healthy mtDNA is the only
contribution by the donor. For families carrying mtDNA, MRT is a
source of hope for a future with genetically related children.353
This is a breakthrough.
In February 2015, the United Kingdom gave its approval to the procedure,
ending a three and one-half year study of “the safety and ethics of creating
humans with DNA from three different people.”354 The process is described as
the following:
MRT is an in vitro fertilization (IVF) technique that involves removing
an intended mother’s nDNA [(nuclear DNA)] from her oocyte or
zygote, which contains mutated mtDNA[ (mitochondrial DNA)], and
transferring it into a female provider’s oocyte or zygote, which contains
nonpathogenic mtDNA and from which the nDNA has been removed.
The woman providing oocytes would have no personal or family history
or genetic evidence of having mutated, pathogenic mtDNA . . . [The]
term “MRT” encompasses both the transfer of the nuclear genetic
material and the accompanying fertilization procedure that is necessary
to produce a human embryo. These techniques could allow intended
mothers to produce a child that would share their nDNA without passing
on their pathogenic mtDNA. Three techniques are most advanced in
development: maternal spindle transfer (MST); pronuclear transfer
(PNT); and, most recent, polar body transfer (PBT).355
Another author describes the procedure as the following:
[MRT] divides the label of the genetic parent even further than the
traditional forms of ART in that a single child conceived by MRT may
have two legitimate ‘genetic mothers.’ This situation results because
MRT works by manipulating egg cells prior to fertilization. Egg cells
consist of nuclei with nuclear DNA—the “instruction manual” for the
cell—and many intracellular organelles that carry on the functions of
our cells—the “machinery” of the cell.’ . . . MRT, then, is a process
which removes the nucleus from one egg and transfers the nucleus into
the remnants of different donated egg (which previously had its nucleus
Garry Hamilton, The Mitochondria Mystery, 525 NATURE 444, 444 (2015).
Bob Zhao, Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy and the Regulation of Reproductive
Genetic Technologies in the United States, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 121, 123-24, (2017).
354 Hamilton, supra note 356, at 444.
355 NAT’L. ACAD. OF SCI.,ENG’G, MED., MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES:
ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 20 (Ann Claiborne, Rebecca English &
Jeffrey Kahn, eds., 1st ed. 2016).
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removed and discarded). The resultant egg has a nucleus from one
individual (the “nuclear mother”) and mitochondrial DNA from a donor
(the “mitochondrial mother”). The father’s sperm then fertilizes the
newly assembled egg, and it is implanted in the nuclear mother in order
to begin the pregnancy.356
With regards to solely its treatment for mitochondrial disease, successful
MRT can make it easier for a woman to conceive, to carry the child to term, and
then to permit the resulting child to live a healthier life.357 Without the procedure,
mitochondrial “DNA mutations can cause diseases and defects in many vital
organs including the brain, liver, heart, and kidneys, they can affect muscles and
the central nervous system, and they ‘may contribute to the development of
common multifactorial disorders such as diabetes mellitus and
neurodegenerative disease.’”358
2. Prospective Regulation
Currently, MRT is legal only in the United Kingdom.359 “In the United States,
in February 2016, a specially constituted committee of the National Academy of
Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (NASEN) sanctioned a slightly narrower
use of MRT than that regulated in the United Kingdom.”360 Concerning
prospective regulation, the statement released by the Committee is cautious:
“The committee concludes that the most germane ethical, social, and policy
considerations associated with MRT could be avoided through limitations on the
use of MRT or are blunted by meaningful differences between the heritable
genetic modification of nDNA and that introduced by MRT. Therefore, the
committee concludes that it is ethically permissible to conduct clinical
investigations of MRT, subject to certain conditions and principles laid out in
this report.”361
Overall, the National Academy of Sciences Committee recommends clinical
studies that will minimize “a future child’s exposure to risk, while ascertaining
the safety and efficacy of the techniques.”362 Specifically, the Committee
recommends:

Green, supra note 27, at 255.
Id. at 256-57.
358 Id. at 256 (“Mitochondrial DNA in women’s eggs tend to deteriorate as they age
thereby increasing risks of disorders developing in both the pregnancy and the resulting
child.”).
359 Schaefer & Labude, supra note 31.
360 Newton et al., supra note 13, at 589.
361 NAT’L. ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, MED., supra note 359, at 2.
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(1) limiting clinical investigations to women who are otherwise at risk
of transmitting mtDNA disease, where the mutation’s pathogenicity is
undisputed, and the clinical presentation of the disease is predicted to
be severe, as characterized by early mortality or substantial impairment
of basic functions; and (2) transferring only male embryos for gestation
to avoid introducing heritable genetic modification during initial
clinical investigations.363
It has been suggested that the United States, overall, takes a more laissez-faire
approach to regulation of assisted reproduction, perhaps due to concerns over
privacy rights implicit in the Constitution.364 However, as the Committee
appointed by the National Academy of Sciences points out, in the United States,
“MRT would be subject to a complex landscape of state and federal laws and
regulations. The legality of the research on MRT—and perhaps even the clinical
application—would vary from state to state as a result of differing laws on fetal
and embryo research, including cloning.”365 Any evaluation of the applicable
regulatory mechanism governing the regulation of MRT is beyond the scope of
this Article, but it illustrates the complexity of the technology—and the debate
it precipitates—when the Committee admits that potential “oversight of both the
research on and clinical use of MRT would me complex, with uncertainty over
the precise interpretation of how laws and regulations would apply.”366
After the MRT baby was successfully born in Mexico in 2016, “it is likely
that other countries will advance consideration of the appropriateness of
mitochondrial treatments being allowed to proceed to implementation and term
birth.”367 Currently, MRT “remains effectively banned or heavily restricted in
many parts of the world, including most of Europe, the USA, Australia, New
Zealand and Singapore, among many others.”368
Many competing claims will be raised in any future discussion of prospective
regulation of MRT.369 In addition to the ones mentioned infra, including utility
of resources, multiple parenthood, and the procreative rights of citizens, there
363 Id. at xv-xvi. (The Committee recommends a policy of transparency, public
engagement, continuing partnership with all regulatory authorities, maximizing data quality,
and limited use of MRT until there is public engagement, and long-term follow-up).
364 Newton et al., supra note 13, at 589.
365 NAT’L. ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, MED., supra note 35, at 59.
366 Id. at 59-60.
367 Kevan MA Gartland et al., Advances in Biotechnology: Genomics and Genome
Editing, 1 EUROBIOTECH J. 2, 9 (2017).
368 Schaefer & Labude, supra note 31.
369 See, e.g., Philip Ball, Designer Babies: An Ethical Horror Waiting to Happen?, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2017, 3:30 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/jan/08/designer-babies-ethical-horror-waitingto-happen (quoting Dartmouth bioethicist, Ronald Green, in stating that gene editing “is
unavoidably in our future . . . [and] will become one of the central foci of our social debates
later in this century and in the century beyond”).
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are the issues of future cloning of humans,370 possible health effects arising from
mitochondrial replacement therapy,371 and the possibility and consequence of
designer babies.372 Opponents of MRT raise ethical and conceptual concerns
over whether “it is a form of germline gene therapy, and whether children born
following [MRT] are genetically modified.”373 Religious and ethical groups will
demand input, all parties producing a composition of the ethical, legal and social
issues involved in this new technology.374 While this discussion continues,
technology will continue to advance calling into question further issues.
V. CONCLUSION
Technological innovation is relentless and ignoring its innovations is perilous.
Change always invites controversy, and this is especially true when change
involves human reproduction. For now, we can make the following assessment
of assisted reproductive technology. First, statistically, an increasing number of
persons and couples are utilizing the various forms of assisted reproduction to
become parents now or in the future. As insurance becomes available to
subsidize the assistance, more persons and couples will take advantage of this
technology and the technology yet to be available. Likewise, surrogacy is more
accepted by the public and by states, especially gestational surrogacy. It is
arguable that the increasing use of assisted reproduction, especially surrogacy,
is influenced by the utilization and acceptance of the LGBTQ community. The
rise of a more functional, rather than form families supports the acceptance of
ART. This is illustrated in the rise of nonmarital cohabitation and statutory
recognition of status arrangements such as de facto parenthood.
Second, states accommodate ART in the postponing of conception until after
the death of the gamete provider. Uniform legislation and an increasing number
of states have enacted posthumous conception statutes, thereby acknowledging

370 See, e.g., Russell A. Spivak et al., Germ-line Gene Editing and Congressional
Reaction in Context: Learning from Almost 50 Years of Congressio1nal Reactions to
Biomedical Breakthroughs, 30 J. L. & HEALTH 20, 31-34 (2017).
371 Hamilton, supra note 356, at 446.
372 See, e.g., Daryl F. Sas & Hannah Martin Lawrenz, CRISPR-Cas9: The Latest Fashion
in Designer Babies, 33 ETHICS & MED. 81 (2017); see generally In U.S. First, Scientists Edit
Genes of Human Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, (July 27, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/07/27/health/ap-us-med-embryos-geneediting.html; Ronald T.K. Pang & P.C. Ho, Designer Babies, 26 OBSTETRICS,
GYNAECOLOGY AND REPROD. MED. 59, 60 (2016).
373 Newson et al., supra note 13, at 589; see also Gartland et al., supra note 371, at 7, 9.
374 See, e.g., Raphaelle Dupras-Leduc et al., Mitochondrial/Nuclear Transfer: A
Literature Review of the Ethical, Legal and Social Issues, 1 CAN. J. OF BIOETHICS, 1, 2-10
(2018).

2018]

Assessing Assisted Reproductive Technology

49

that a decedent donor could become a parent long after his or her death.
Undoubtedly, this technology will strain state efforts to accommodate testate,
intestate, and non-probate wealth after the decedent’s death. However, as with
other advances, an accommodation will be found. The fact that courts and states
are grappling with issues presented signals an ascending acceptance of the fact
of ART technology.
Third, ART’s technological advances will test the limits of the Constitution:
privacy, the right to liberty, equal protection, due process, and freedom of
religion will all be inculcated into an ongoing debate of what is right, wrong, or
simply a slippery slope.
Fourth, for the first time in history, it is now possible for a baby to have more
than two genetic parents. Conceptually, it is possible that a child could have
more than two parents through stepparent adoption, surrogacy, or intentionality
and functionality. However, until recently, the fact was that a baby only had two
genetic parents. Today, technology makes it possible—and the birth of a baby
in 2016—illustrates this, for a child to have more than two genetic parents
through mitochondrial transfer (MRT). While the transfer will allow for a
woman to have a genetic connection to her baby, it also prevents the debilitating
effects of mitochondrial disease. The technological parameters of this innovation
are nascent, and the procedure and prospective regulations are undetermined.
This Article makes no assessment of the ethical, legal or sociological
assessments of the evolution of assisted reproductive technology. Instead, the
goal of this Article is to provide an assessment of where the technology is at this
point in history. Providing an assessment will make it easier to formulate an
approach to human reproduction through assisted means.
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